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LOST FIDELITIES
BARRY CUSHMAN

Owen Roberts was accused of a variety of things in 1937, but
fidelity was not among them. While he was widely razzed for his
apparently inconsistent performance on the bench, some of the
most trenchant criticism came from insiders. Referring to the
April 12 decisions upholding the National Labor Relations Act,
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone remarked, "in order to reach the
result which was reached in these cases last Monday, it was
necessary for six members of the Court either to be overruled or
to take back some things they subscribed to in the Guffey Coal
Act case."' Felix Frankfurter, an intimate of Justice Brandeis
* Elizabeth D. & Richard A. Merrill Research Professor of Law, University of
Virginia. The author is grateful to Richard Friedman, John Harrison, G. Edward
White, and the members of the Virginia Legal Studies Workshop for helpful suggestions, and to Scott Matthews and Charles Stormont for valuable research assistance.
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(1956). There is evidence that Roberts's behavior perplexed other members of the
Court as well. See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311,
315 (1955) (reproducing a memorandum in which Roberts reported that when he
voted in conference against summary disposition in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937), one of the Four Horsemen asked another, "What is the matter
with Roberts?"). Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Justice Cardozo's clerk in 1937, offered two
somewhat differing accounts suggesting that Cardozo agreed with Stone's assessment.
In the first account, published in 1983, Rauh reported that he was waiting at the
Justice's apartment when Cardozo
came back after the Wagner Act had been upheld in the Jones and
Laughlin case. He said, "Oh, Mr. Rauh, you won't believe what happened. Roberts and Hughes switched without even saying why they were
switching." He referred to the fact that in the Carter Coal case the year
before the Court had ruled out a law very similar to the Wagner Act.
Everyone knew why. It was because Roosevelt's Court-packing plan had
the Court scared stiff. I still remember the wonderment with which
Cardozo said, "You know, judges ought to explain their actions. They
have a right to change, but they oughtn't to pretend that they're not
changing." He had such a wonderful time when things like that happened. Of course, it was a vindication for him because he'd written the
Carter Coal dissent and now that was the law of the land.
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and a persistent correspondent of Stone's, wrote the latter that
2
Roberts's "somersault" in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish
was
"incapable of being attributed to a single factor relevant to the
professed judicial process. Everything that he now subscribes to
he rejected not only June first last, but as late as October
twelfth.... It is very, very sad business."' On the day the Court
announced it decisions in the Labor Board Cases, Frankfurter
THE MAKING OF THE NEW DEAL: THE INSIDERS SPEAK 58 (Katie Loucheim ed., 1983)

(citations omitted). In the second account, published in 1990, Rauh recounted that:
when Cardozo reported on the conference action during our ride home from
the courthouse, he was elated by the switches. But about all that this kindly
gentleman could bring himself to say in criticism was that he "considered it
quite an achievement to make the shift without even a mention of the burial
of a recent case." He did smile some time later when I told him the gag going
around about a "switch in time saves Nine," but he never said anything like
that himself.
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., An Unabashed Liberal Looks at a Half-Century of the Supreme
Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 213, 217-18 (1990). Interestingly, Felix Frankfurter had used
a similar locution in praising Roberts's opinion in Nebbia u. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934). Roberts, he wrote, had "showed what an empty husk 'affected with a public
interest' really is and didn't even give decent Christian burial to the SutherlandButlerian concoction that price-fixing is forbidden by the Constitution." Letter from
Felix Frankfurter to Learned Hand (Mar. 15, 1934), quoted in MICHAEL E. PARRISH,
FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 257 (1982).
The Cardozo-Rauh conversation is not related in Richard Polenberg's recent
biography, The World of Benjamin Cardozo: Personal Values and the Judicial Process
(1997). Andrew Kaufman, however, citing his 1958 interview with Mr. Rauh, reports
that Cardozo was "amazed when both Hughes and Roberts voted at conference to
uphold the statute" in the Labor Board Cases (NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)), because Cardozo had
been unable to "find a satisfactory distinction" between the facts of those cases and
those of Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). ANDREW L. KAUFMAN,
CARDOZO 526 (1998). The day after the Court announced the decisions, Cardozo
wrote to Frankfurter: "What a change in the centre of gravity ... since the previous term ended a year ago." Id.
For a discussion of whether the Labor Board Cases are plausibly understood as
a vindication of Cardozo's dissent in Carter Coal, see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING
THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 170-74

(1998).
2. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
3. Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (Mar. 30,
1937), quoted in PARRISH, supra note 1, at 271. On June 1, 1936, Roberts had joined
the majority in striking down New York's minimum wage statute in Morehead v.
New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). On October 12, the Court had denied
the State's petition for rehearing. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 299
U.S. 619 (1936) (mem).
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wrote to Franklin Roosevelt, "I feel like finding some honest
profession to enter."4 The following day Frankfurter wrote to
Charles Wyzanski:
To me it is all painful beyond words, the poignant grief of one
whose life has been dedicated to faith in the disinterestedness of a tribunal and its freedom from responsiveness to the
most obvious immediacies of politics.... It all ... gives one a

sickening feeling which is aroused when moral standards are
adulterated in a convent.5
Eight years later, in 1945, Roberts announced his resignation
from the Court. It fell to then-Chief Justice Stone to draft the
customary letter from the Justices to a departing colleague.
Stone's letter expressed "a profound sense of regret that our
association with you in the daily work of the Court must now
come to an end."' It commended Roberts for having "given to the
work of the Court the benefit of your skill and wide knowledge
of the law, gained through years of assiduous study and practice
of your profession," and for having "faithfully discharged the
heavy responsibility which rests upon a Justice of this Court
with promptness and dispatch, and with untiring energy."' Finally, the letter assured Roberts of his colleagues' "continued
good will and friendly regard," and wished him "good health,
abiding strength" and "the full enjoyment of those durable satisfactions which will come from the continued devotion of your
knowledge and skill to worthy achievement."'
An effusive letter this was not. Justice Robert Jackson characterized it as "formal and not too cordial."' Frankfurter, now himself an Associate Justice, described it as "the minimum of what
you could write and say anything that wasn't ungracious."10 it
4. Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to President Franklin Roosevelt (Apr. 12,
1937), quoted in PARRISH, supra note 1, at 271.
5. Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Charles Wyzanski (Apr. 13, 1937),
quoted in PARRISH, supra note 1, at 272.
6. Memorandum from Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to the Court, quoted in
MASON, supra note 1, at 765.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 766.
9. Letter from Justice Robert Jackson to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (Sept.
8, 1945), quoted in MASON, supra note 1, at 767.
10. Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone
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was "'to say the least not overgenerous."' But Stone's draft did
contain one sentence of tribute that provoked such a controversy
among the Justices that no letter to Roberts ever was sent. The
tribute in question read: "You have made fidelity to principle
your guide to decision."' Justice Hugo Black objected to this
sentence and refused to sign the letter unless it were omitted.
Justice William 0. Douglas sided with Black."3 Justice Jackson
objected that omission of the sentence left the letter "reading
like a left-handed condemnation,"14 and wrote Stone that he did
not want to join a letter to Roberts "that deliberately omits the
only sentence that credits him with good motives-the quality I
think he possessed above all others."" Roberts, he insisted, "deserves better of us.""6
The most vehement advocate for retaining the sentence, however, was Frankfurter. As he wrote Stone, he could not "in selfrespect" sign any letter from which it was omitted:
So to do, would involve acquiescence in denial that Roberts
has "made fidelity to principle" his "guide to decision." If
there's one thing true about Roberts, that's it! He had, from
my point of view, serious intellectual limitations-above all, a
lack of a more or less coherent juristic or social philosophy,
except in a very few defined areas. But "fidelity" to what
were for him the governing "principles" for the decision in a
case was his outstanding characteristic-often nisconceiving
of course the relevance of principles or their conditioned limits. I know that was Brandeis' strong view of him.""

(Aug. 20, 1945) (on file in the Frankfurter Papers, LC, Reel 64).
11. Id. (quoting Letter from Justice Robert Jackson to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone (Sept. 8, 1945)).
12. MASON, supra note 1, at 765 (quoting from the "Memorandum for the Court").
13. See MASON, supra note 1, at 766-67; Letter from Justice Frankfurter to Chief
Justice Stone (Aug. 25, 1945) (on file in the Frankfurter Papers, Harvard, Series III,
Reel 4); Letter from Chief Justice Stone to Justice Frankfurter (Sept. 18, 1945) (on
file in the Frankfurter Papers, LC, Reel 64).
14. Letter from Justice Jackson to Chief Justice Stone (Sept. 8, 1945) (on file in
the Frankfurter Papers, Harvard, Series III, Reel 4), quoted in MASON, supra note 1,
at 767.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Letter from Justice Frankfurter to Chief Justice Stone (Aug. 20, 1945), supra
note 10.
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Ten days later Frankfurter expressed these views to all of his
colleagues. In a letter addressed "Dear Brethren," Frankfurter
wrote:
I cannot be party to the denial, under challenge, of what I
believe to be the fundamental truth about Roberts, the Justice,--that he "made fidelity to principle" his "guide to decision." I know that that was Justice Brandeis' view of Roberts,
whose character he held in the highest esteem. My numerous
and serious disagreements with Roberts are, of course, beside
the point. 8
The squabble over the Roberts retirement letter reflected deep
personal and jurisprudential divisions that had emerged on the
Stone Court." But these cleavages alone do not explain the form
that the fight took. In particular, they do not explain why the
proponents of Stone's letter were, in 1945, insistent upon characterizing Roberts in a manner so at odds with their assessments
of him only eight years earlier. To be sure, fellow feeling and a
sense of decorum informed the campaign for a gracious farewell.
Bift why were Jackson and particularly Frankfurter prepared to
go to the mat over a sentence that praised Roberts for, of all
things, his "fidelity to principle"? And why did Stone, the only
other remaining member of the 1937 Court, select such an obviously contested encomium in the first place?
An examination of Roberts's performance in economic regulation cases raising Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment questions
may provide a better understanding of how Stone, Jackson, and
Frankfurter might have come to see a consistency and integrity
to their departing colleague's jurisprudence that others did not
detect. That examination, which is the focus of Part III of this
Article, should in turn provide an improved understanding of the
mechanisms of constitutional change in the 1930s. Before undertaking that inquiry, however, we must first briefly survey the
contours of the constitutional landscape within which Roberts

18. Letter from Justice Frankfurter to "Dear Brethren," (Aug. 30, 1945) (on file in
Box 62, Hugo Black MSS, LC).
19. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT UNDER
STONE AND VINSON, 1941-1953, at 45-46 (1997).
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worked, and we must also attempt a situated understanding of
the contemporary significance of his landmark opinion in Nebbia
v. New York. 20
I. ECONoMIc LIBERTY AND 1937
Roberts served on the Court during a period of extraordinary
constitutional ferment. The American constitutional order underwent striking transformations during his tenure. But our
accounts of this transformation must not proceed at such high
levels of generality that we exaggerate discontinuities and sacrifice nuance and descriptive power. The birthing of our modern
constitutional order was long, slow, tortuous, and occasionally
painful; we must resist the temptation to compress all of the
significant constitutional change of the New Deal Era into a
sixty-day window in the spring of 1937. To do so is to make two
errors: first, to overlook the lingering agonies, public and private, of older doctrinal commitments;" and second, to apply too
steep a discount to the importance of antecedent constitutional
development that brought much of the New Deal into the realm
of constitutional possibility.
In order to appreciate the nature and extent of 1937's transformations in constitutional jurisprudence, we must first understand a few things about the structure of the constitutional
order upon Franklin Roosevelt's accession to the presidency.
First, we must recognize that any characterization of the period
between 1890 and 1937 as an age of rampant anti-regulatory
activism simply fails to capture the texture and the dynamic
quality of the Court's jurisprudence during this period. As several scholars have taught us, the number of cases in which the
Justices of this era invalidated economic regulation simply pales
in comparison to the number of such statutes they sustained.2 2
20. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
21. I discuss these agonies with respect to the Commerce Clause in CUSHMAN,
supra note 1, at 177-224. In this Article, I focus discussion on Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment restraints on the governments power to regulate economic activity.
22. See, e.g., Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme
Court, 40 HARV. L. REV. 943, 945 n.11 (1927) (stating that the Supreme Court invalidated 6 of 98 police regulations challenged on due process grounds between 1868
and 1912, 7 of 97 between 1913 and 1920, and 15 of 53 between 1921 and 1927);
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Take, for example, the type of regulation invalidated in Lochner
v. New York.' Of the more than twenty working-hours cases
that the Court decided between 1898 and 1930,2 I know of only
one other than Lochner in which the Court invalidated such a
regulation; and that decision didn't even cite Lochner as authority.25 As far as the regulation of working hours is concerned,
Lochner is an exceptional rather than a representative case.
Thomas Reed Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislation, 37 HARV. L.
REv. 545, 555 (1924) ("lhe catalogue shows that the Court has sustained many
more regulatory statutes than it has annulled."); Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 294-95 (1913)
(explaining that of the 560 cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment between
1887 and 1911, only three invalidated social and economic regulation). See generally
Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process
Effective?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1049 (1997) (examining the frequency with which the
Court invoked substantive due process to invalidate government action from 1897 to
1937); Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective Legislation in the Progressive Era, 1983 SUP. OT. HIST. SOcY Y.B. 53, 70 ("[Hjostility to
protective legislation was just not the norm in the Progressive era.").
23. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
24. See, e.g., Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (upholding statute prohibiting employment of women in large-city restaurants between 10 P.M. and 6 A.M.);
United States v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 249 U.S. 296 (1919) (holding terminal
subject to federal Hours of Service Act); Dominion Hotel, Inc. v. Arizona, 249 U.S.
265 (1919) (upholding statute limiting working hours of women in hotels); Chicago &
Alton R.R. v. United States, 247 U.S. 197 (1918) (affirming conviction for violation of
the federal Hours of Service Act); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United
States, 244 U.S. 336 (1917) (affirming conviction for violation of the federal Hours of
Service Act); Bunting v. Oregon, .243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding maximum hours law
for employees of mills and factories); Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917) (upholding
maximum hours law for railway workers); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915)
(upholding maximum hours law for women); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915)
(same); Hawley v. Walker, 232 U.S. 718 (1914) (same); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232
U.S. 671 (1914) (per curiam) (same); Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. of Texas v.
United States, 231 U.S. 112 (1913) (affirming convictions for violation of federal
Hours of Service Act); United States v. Garbish, 222 U.S. 257 (1911) (construing
strictly exceptions to an eight-hour workday law for public works); Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. Co. v.* ICC, 221 U.S. 612 (1911) (upholding federal Hours of Service Act); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum hours law for women); Ellis
v. United States, 206 U.S. 246 (1907) (upholding maximum hours law for public
works); Cantwell v. Missouri, 199 U.S. 602 (1905) (per curiam) (upholding maximum
hours law for mine workers); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903) (upholding maximum hours law for public works); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding
maximum hours law for miners); Elkan v. State, 90 A. 183 (Md. 1914) (upholding
maximum hours law for public works).
25. See Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 267 U.S. 552
(1925).
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During this period the Court also upheld not only hours regulations, but numerous wage and payment regulations, occupational licensing statutes, utility regulations, a national collective
bargaining statute, state child labor laws, workmen's compensation statutes and statutes abrogating common law tort defenses,
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission and numerous state and federal antitrust laws, the
Safety Appliance Act, the Federal Employers Liability Act, the
Pure Food and Drug Act, the Packers and Stockyards Act, the
Grain Futures Act, a federal-state program providing grants for
nutrition for expectant mothers, and a vast array of federal,
state, and local taxation and police power statutes.2 6 If this was
a night watchman state, then this night watchman had a very
active thyroid. Calling this period "the Lochner Era" may be a
little like calling the 1980s "the Al Franken decade." For decades
preceding the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt, the Court had
repeatedly accommodated, on both the state and national levels,
the emergence of an active, expanding, regulatory and welfare
state.
Of course, this is not to deny that the Court was far more active in scrutinizing economic regulation before 1937 than it has
been since. "Lochnerism" was not confined to working hours
statutes, and there is no gainsaying the existence of cases like
Adair v. United States,2 7 striking down a federal anti-yellow dog
contract statute," Tyson & Brotherv. Banton,2 9 invalidating state
1 scuttling
price regulation,3 0 and Adkins v. Children'sHospital,"
a minimum wage statute for women." Nor can we casually dismiss the significant constraints that such precedents imposed
upon regulatory reform. But if we are to evaluate the importance of "1937," we must understand the trajectory of the lives of
these strands of substantive due process. By the time Bunting v.

26. For a catalog of such decisions, see Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the
Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 561-71, 586-638 nn.22-121 (1997).
27. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
28. See id. at 180.
29. 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
30. See id. at 445.
31. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
32. See id. at 562.
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Oregon"3 was decided in 1917, it was clear that the Court would
no longer hold that regulation of the hours of labor in the ordinary trades was beyond the reach of the police power. In the
1930 case of Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood
of Railway & Steamship Clerks,3" the Court effectively overruled
Adair, thereby removing a critical due process obstacle to collective bargaining legislation." In 1934, Nebbia v. New York"
abandoned the doctrine restricting price regulation to a narrow
category of businesses affected with a public interest.3 7 Nebbia's
abandonment of this "business affected with a public interest"
limitation, however, had ramifications extending well beyond the
domain of price regulation. For the public/private distinction was
a central organizing principle of economic substantive due process. This is why Justice McReynolds, who had written an anguished dissent recognizing those ramifications,3 8 wrote James
Beck that Nebbia and Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell"
marked "the end of the Constitution as you and I regarded it. An
Alien influence has prevailed."' This "Alien influence" by the
way, was Herbert Hoover, who had appointed Hughes, Roberts,
and Cardozo, the Justices providing the margin of victory in
those two cases. Chief Justice Taft always had distrusted Hoover
as a "Progressive," and feared his own death while Hoover was
in office lest "the Bolsheviki" gain control of the Court."
McReynolds's fears with respect to Nebbia were realized in part
when the Court rejected substantive due process challenges to
the application of the Wagner Act's collective bargaining provisions to three manufacturing concerns he considered "private" in
1937;42 but here, as with the minimum wage, 1937 was a doc-

33. 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
34. 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
35. See id. at 570-71.
36. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
37. See id. at 536.
38. See id. at 539-59 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
39. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
40. Letter from Justice McReynolds to James M. Beck (Apr. 10, 1934), quoted in
MORTON KELLER, IN DEFENSE OF YESTERDAY: JAMES M. BECK AND THE POLITICS OF
CONSERVATISM 1861-1936, at 254 (1958).
41. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 225.
42. See NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 76, 101-03
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trinal denouement. Indeed, because regulation of wages had
been sustained repeatedly when the employment in question
was public or affected with a public interest,' a wide variety of
observers-ranging from Robert Hale to the Four Horsemen-opined that Nebbia heralded the death of Adkins." There
would be one more bump along the road in the form of Morehead
v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo45 in 1936; but these prophecies were
fulfilled the very next year in an opinion that relied extensively
on Nebbia's authority.46 I follow a number of contemporary observers in believing that the Tipaldo aberration can be exbut even if these commentators misunderstood
plained;
Nebbia's implications for Adkins, which is doubtful, it is nevertheless safe to say that by 1937 the prohibition against minimum wage legislation was pretty close to all that was left of
economic substantive due process.
Even that piece had been hanging by a thread for two decades. In 1917, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision upholding
Oregon's minimum wage law by an equally divided Court.4 1 Justice Brandeis had counseled the state on the matter before his
appointment to the bench, and so recused himself.49 Had he been
at liberty to participate, minimum wage laws for women would
have received the Court's imprimatur right in the middle of the
Lochner Era.o By the time the issue came back to the Court in
1923, personnel changes had shifted the balance. Unconstrained
by any decision with precedential force, the Justices invalidated
the District of Columbia's minimum wage law by a vote of five to
(McReynolds, J., dissenting).
43. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 56-60, 62-64, 73-78.
44. See infra note 129.
45. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
46. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
47. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 92-104.
48. See Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917). During that same term the Court
upheld both a federal statute establishing a temporary minimum daily wage for
railway workers in Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917), and an Oregon statute limiting working hours in certain employments and requiring time-and-a-half payment for
overtime work in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). For other instances in
which the Court upheld wage regulation, see CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 56-60.
49. See ALEXANDER BICKEL & BENNO SCHMIDT, THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE
GOVERNMENT, 1910-1921, at 592-603 (1984).
50. See id. at 602; CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 61-62.
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three, with Brandeis again not participating." Only two years
later, however, Justice Stone replaced Justice McKenna. 2 If at
that time he held the same views on the issue that he would announce in dissent eleven years later,53 by 1925 there were again
five votes for the constitutionality of minimum wage regulation.
In fact, there were apparently three occasions between 1925 and
1937 in which the Court affirmed a decision invalidating a state
minimum wage law notwithstanding the fact that a majority of
the Justices believed that Adkins had been wrongly decided.' If
so, Parrish signaled not a change in the long-held substantive
views of a Court majority, but instead a refusal to allow stare
decisis any longer to impede their formal adoption.
II. FIDELITY, 1934-1937
I have argued elsewhere that Nebbia's abandonment of the
public interest limitation played a critical role not only in the
minimum wage story, but more broadly in many of the constitutional successes of the Second New Deal." These consequences

51. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 525 (1923). Thomas Reed Powell
contended that there was a majority for sustaining the minimum wage until June of
1922, and that the appeal in Adkins might have been heard and a favorable decision
rendered by that time had not the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
ordered the case reheard and reargued after an initial decision upholding the statute. See Powell, supra note 22, at 547-56. Powell's survey of decisions of state supreme courts, federal appellate courts, and the United States Supreme Court revealed that 35 of the 45 judges sitting in cases challenging the constitutionality of
minimum wage legislation had voted to uphold the statute. See id. at 547-53.
52. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1921-1930, 1986
DUKE L.J. 65, 65.
53. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
54. In Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925) (per curiam), the Court affirmed a
decision invalidating Arizona's minimum wage statute. See id. Justice Brandeis dissented, and Justice Holmes noted that he concurred solely because he considered
himself bound by the authority of Adkins. See id. at 536. The other dissenters in
Adkins, Chief Justice Taft and Justice Sanford, concurred silently, as did Stone. See
id. Donham v. West-Nelson Manufacturing Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927), affirmed per
curiam a decision invalidating Arkansas's minimum wage statute. See id. at 657.
Brandeis again noted a dissent, but this time Holmes, Taft, Sanford, and Stone each
concurred silently. See id. The third instance, of course, was Morehead v. New York
ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 92-104.
55. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 134-215.
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flowed not from something as amorphous and unrefined as a
new "attitude" toward "social legislation" or the embrace of the
"pro-regulatory principles" of "big government," but instead from
the fact that lawmakers and advocates recognized and exploited
opportunities presented by Nebbia's reconfiguration of an elaborated structure of doctrine." Just as it would be a mistake to
characterize the American constitutional order before 1934 as a
regime of laissez-faire, so it also would be ridiculous to suggest
that Nebbia lifted all limitations on governmental regulatory
power. It plainly did not. Nebbia concerned restraints imposed
on governmental regulatory authority by the Due Process
Clause. It did not purport to retire the Tenth Amendment.5 7 It
did not promise unrestrained license to delegate governmental
power." It did not discard the doctrine of intergovernmental
immunities." It did not overrule a century of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.6 0 Nebbia did not hit safely in fiftysix consecutive baseball games. Nebbia did not clean anyone's
oven.
The Court's performance in the three years following Nebbia
does create some interesting puzzles, and it is the purpose of the
next Part to explore and unpack them. First, however, it should
be recognized that those puzzles are reduced to only a few if we
avoid the mistake of thinking about the decisions in gross terms.
We should not find it surprising that Roberts and Hughes voted
in 1935 to strike down provisions of the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA) on nondelegation grounds6 1 and in 1936 to
invalidate the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) on Tenth

56. See id.
57. See infra notes 62, 65-66. Nebbia did, however, have important consequences
for Commerce Clause doctrine. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 154-55, 193-96, 20307.
58. See infra note 61.
59. See infra note 63.
60. See, for example, Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), in which
Justice Cardozo wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court, holding that a New York
regulation prohibiting the sale of milk imported from out-of-state unless the price
paid to the producer equaled or exceeded New York's minimum price, violated the
dormant Commerce Clause. See id. at 528.
61. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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Amendment grounds.6 2 Nor should we be shocked to find Roberts
in the majority in a 1936 decision holding that the Municipal
Bankruptcy Act ran afoul of the doctrine of intergovernmental
immunities." In none of the opinions in these cases-majority,
concurring, or dissenting-was Nebbia even mentioned." Neither should holdings that provisions of the NIRA and the National Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 exceeded
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce leave us
scratching our heads in bewilderment. It would have been
suprising had Hughes's Schechter opinion held that the Live
Poultry Code's wage and hour regulations violated the Due Process Clause.s But it did not. It would have been surprising had
the majority opinion in Carter Coal held that the wage, hour, or
price regulation provisions of the Guffey Coal Act deprived employers or employees of liberty of contract. But it did not.
These high-profile decisions striking down legislation between
1934 and 1937 were inconsistent with Nebbia only in the sense
that Nebbia upheld a government regulation. But comparisons
made at the level of abstraction at which doctrinal categories are
utterly ignored are not always the most illuminating.
Only with attention to such doctrinal categories-the kind of
attention with which legal thinkers of the day treated them-can
we avoid an anachronistic assessment of Nebbia's contemporary
62. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
63. See Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513
(1936).
64. Nor did the Court mention Nebbia in Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
65. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 551 (declining specifically to take up the
due process arguments).
66. The majority struck down the wage and hour provisions on the ground that
(a) they exceeded the scope of the commerce power, and, (b) insofar as the Act delegated to the majority of coal producers, rather than to the government, the power to
fix the hours and wages of employees of other coal producers, it was "clearly arbitrary" and thus violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). The majority invalidated the price provisions due to their alleged inseparability from the wage and hour provisions. See id.
at 312-16. The failure of the majority to hold squarely that wage and price regulation infringed liberty of contract was conspicuous. See ic. at 304, 310-16; CusHMAN,
supra note 1, at 92-93. Chief Justice Hughes, who in a concurring opinion agreed
that the labor provisions were invalid on federalism grounds, invoked Nebbia in
support of his view that the price regulation provisions were valid. See Carter Coal,
298 U.S. at 319 (Hughes, C.J., concurring).
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significance. And examination of a variety of sources suggests
that Nebbia's significance should not be underestimated. We
might profitably begin with a review of lower court cases that
were decided between Nebbia and West Coast Hotel, involved
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment challenges, and discussed (or at
least mentioned) Nebbia. The milk business was one of the most
heavily regulated in the 1930s, and it is no surprise to find that
Nebbia was cited most frequently in cases concerning the constitutionality of state and local regulation of various aspects of that
enterprise.6 7 Nebbia's authority, however, was by no means un67. See, e.g., Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 16 F. Supp. 575, 580-82 (E.D.
Va. 1936) (upholding Virginia milk control law), affd 300 U.S. 608 (1937); Birkheiser
v. City of Los Angeles, 11 F. Supp. 689, 689-90 (S.D. Cal. 1935) (upholding municipal regulation of milk delivery); Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 7 F. Supp.
352, 353 (S.D.N.Y.) (upholding provision of New York milk control law permitting
dealers of "unadvertised milk" to sell at a price lower than that prescribed for dealers in milk sold under trade names), reu'd, 293 U.S. 194 (1934); Hegeman Farms
Corp. v. Baldwin, 6 F. Supp. 297, 297-98 (S.D.N.Y.) (upholding provisions of New
York milk control law), affd, 293 U.S. 163 (1934); Franklin v. State ex rel. Alabama
State Milk Control Bd., 169 So. 295, 298 (Ala. 1936) (upholding Alabama milk control law); Miami Home Milk Producers Ass'n v. Milk Control Bd., 169 So. 541, 547
(Fla. 1936) (upholding Florida milk control law); Albert v. Milk Control Bd., 200
N.E. 688, 691-95 (Ind. 1936) (upholding Indiana milk control law); Hy-Grade Dairies
v. Falls City Milk Producers Ass'n, 86 S.W.2d 1046, 1047 (Ky. 1935) (upholding
regulation of marketing of milk); In re Opinion of the Justices, 190 A. 713, 714-15
(N.H. 1937) (upholding milk regulation); State ex rel. State Bd. of Milk Control v.
Newark Milk Co., 179 A. 116, 122-26 (N.J. 1935) (upholding New Jersey milk control law); State Bd. of Milk Control v. Richman Ice Cream Co., 175 A. 796, 797
(N.J. 1934) (upholding New Jersey milk control law); Mayflower Farms, Inc. v.
Baldwin, 195 N.E. 532, 532, 534, 536 (N.Y. 1935) (upholding statute permitting
dealers in "unadvertised" milk to sell at a price lower than that permitted for dealers selling milk under a trade name), rev'd, 297 U.S. 266 (1936); John E. Rosasco
Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen, 292 N.Y.S. 1, 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936) (holding contract
entered into in violation of New York Milk Control Law unenforceable), rev'd, 11
N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1937); Muller Dairies, Inc. v. Baldwin, 274 N.Y.S. 975, 978 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1934) (upholding Milk Control Board's denial of license renewal); Ten Eyck
v. Eastern Farm Prods., 290 N.Y.S. 475, 476 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936) (upholding provision of New York Milk Control Law); Royce v. Rosasco, 287 N.Y.S. 692, 706-08 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1936) (upholding provisions of New York Milk Control Law); Co-operative
Dairymen v. Ten Eyck, 286 N.Y.S. 351, 355 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936) (refusing to grant
injunction to restrain state commissioner of agriculture and markets from canceling
milk dealer's license); Baldwin v. Lenahan, 293 N.Y.S. 742, 743-44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1935) (upholding licensing requirement for milk dealing); Stark County Milk
Producers' Ass'n v. Tabeling, 194 N.E. 16, 19-20 (Ohio 1934) (upholding milk marketing co-operative established pursuant to statute); Rohrer v. Milk Control Bd., 186 A.
336, 338-43 (Pa. 1936) (upholding Pennsylvania milk control law), rev'g Rohrer v.
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derstood to be confined to the dairy industry. Courts invoked
Roberts's opinion in support of a wide variety of state and local
exercises of the police power." To be sure, some courts were
Milk Control Bd., 184 A. 133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936) (holding milk control act violated
Pennsylvania state constitution); Dairymen's Co-operative Sales Ass'n v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 174 A. 826, 830 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1934) (upholding state regulation of
transportation of milk), affd, 177 A. 770 (Pa. 1935); Reynolds v. Milk Comm'n of
Virginia, 179 S.E. 507, 514-15 (Va. 1935) (upholding Virginia milk control law), superseding 177 S.E. 44 (Va. 1934) (holding Virginia milk control law violated Virginia
state constitution); State ex rel. Finnegan v. Lincoln Dairy Co., 265 N.W. 197, 201
(Wis. 1936) (upholding Wisconsin milk control law). But see State v. Old Tavern
Farm, Inc., 180 A. 473, 482-86 (Me. 1935) (divided court invalidating requirement of
posting bond as precondition to obtaining license to operate a milk gathering station); Sheffield Farms Co. v. Seaman, 177 A. 372, 374-75 (N.J. 1935) (finding that
city may not arbitrarily deny a license to sell and distribute milk).
68. See, e.g., Jewel Tea Co. v. City of Troy, 80 F.2d 366, 368 (7th Cir. 1935) (upholding municipal ordinance regulating and licensing vehicles carrying foodstuffs);
S.H. Kress & Co. v. Johnson, 16 F. Supp. 5, 8-9 (D. Colo.), affd per curiam, 299
U.S. 511 (1936) (upholding regulation of restaurant business); Premier-Pabst Sales
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 13 F. Supp. 90, 95, 97 (S.D. Cal. 1935) (upholding
state regulation of advertising for sale of alcoholic beverages); In re Interrogatories
of the Governor on Chapter 118, Sess. Laws, 52 P.2d 663, 667 (Col. 1935) (upholding
statute providing for licensing of establishments preparing food for human consumption); Ex parte Hawthorne, 156 So. 619, 622-23 (Fla. 1934) (upholding state regulation of primary election campaigns); Territory v. Fung, 34 Haw. 52, No. 2302, 1936
WL 4430, at *2 (Dec. 23, 1936) (upholding requirement that common carriers by
automobile obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity); People ex rel.
McLaughlin v. G. H. Cross Co., 198 N.E. 356, 362-63 (Ill. 1935) (upholding statute
regulating consignment and sale on commission of farm produce), affd sub nom.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Illinois ex rel. McLaughlin 298 U.S. 155 (1936);
Nourse v. City of Russellville, 78 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Ky. 1935) (upholding municipal
power to define, declare and abate nuisances, and citing Nebbia for the proposition
that "[t]he right of property is a legal right and not a natural right, and it must be
measured by reference to the rights of others and of the public"); Locatelli v. City of
Medford, 192 N.E. 57, 58 (Mass. 1934) (upholding zoning ordinance creating district
restricted to single residences); City of St. Paul v. Clark, 259 N.W. 824, 824-25
(Minn. 1935) (upholding ordinance establishing minimum taxi fares); State ex rel.
Freeman v. Abstracters Bd. of Exam'rs, 45 P.2d 668, 672 (Mont. 1935) (upholding
statute requiring applicant for a certificate of authority to conduct abstracting business to provide a set of abstract books showing all instruments affecting title to real
estate); In re Mechanics Trust Co., 181 A. 423, 434 (N.J. 1935) (upholding statutory
scheme for reorganization of insolvent financial institutions); People v. Vitale, 272
N.Y.S. 503, 505-06 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1934) (upholding state alcoholic beverage control
licensing law); State v. Eubank, 9 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ohio App.) (upholding statute
requiring a license to operate a steam boiler), appeal dismissed, 8 N.E.2d 247 (Ohio),
and appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 646 (1937); Creditors' Serv. Corp. v. Cummings, 190
A. 2, 8 (R.I. 1937) (upholding statute prohibiting debt adjustment by non-attorneys).
But see Scully v. Hallihan, 6 N.E.2d 176, 181 (Ill. 1936) (striking down as unrea-
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chary of interpreting such a departure from precedent too broadly. In New York, where a closely divided Court of Appeals struck
down the state's minimum wage statute in People ex rel. Tipaldo
v. Morehead," courts also invalidated a provision of a fair trade
statute prescribing that the minimum resale prices for books,"o
perfumes, toilet preparations, and cosmetics 7 ' not be lower than
that established by contract between the producer and any other
retailer of the item in question. The court of chancery of neighboring New Jersey followed suit, invalidating the provisions of
its identical state fair trade act as applied to a retailer of dental
cream, tooth brushes, shaving cream, baby powder, Listerine,
and sal hepatica. 72 And a vigorous debate over Nebbia's implications for the scope of state power to regulate the barbering trade
broke out in the state courts, with four of six jurisdictions rebuffing intrusions into the sanctum tonsorium.73 Although efforts

sonable licensing requirements in the drain-laying trade); Olds v. Klotz, 3 N.E.2d
371, 374 (Ohio 1936) (striking down as unreasonable statute prescribing opening and
closing hours for retail food and grocery stores).
69. 200 N.E. 799 (N.Y.), affd, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
70. Compare Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 199 N.E. 409, 410-11
(N.Y. 1936) (invalidating a statute fixing the price for books on the ground that
books were "not 'affected with a public interest'"), overruled in part by Bouijois Sales
Corp. v. Dorfman, 7 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1937), with People v. Kahn, 60 P.2d 596, 599
(Cal. App. 1936) (relying on Nebbia in upholding conviction under state unfair practices act for selling a six-pound can of Crisco below cost for the purpose of injuring
competitors and destroying competition), and Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 2
N.E.2d 929, 935-37 (Ill.) (relying on Nebbia in upholding state fair trade statute prescribing minimum resale prices for whiskey), affd sub nom. Old Dearborn Distrib.
Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
71. See Coty, Inc. v. Hearn Dep't Stores, Inc. 284 N.Y.S. 909, 918-25 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1935).
72. See Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard, 184 A. 783, 789 (N.J. Ch. 1936), rev'd,
191 A. 873 (N.J. 1937).
73. Compare Wilson v. City of Zanesville, 199 N.E. 187, 191-92 (Ohio 1935) (divided court upholding municipal regulation of opening and closing hours for barber
shops), overruled in part by City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 49 N.E.2d 412 (Ohio 1948),
and State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Fasekas, 269 N.W. 700, 704-05 (Wis. 1936) (divided court upholding wage and price regulation in the trade notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Ypaldo), with City of Mobile v. Rouse, 173 So. 254, 263
(Ala. Ct. App. 1937) (divided court invalidating municipal price regulation of barber
services), and City of Mobile v. Gibson, 173 So. 264, 264 (Ala. Ct. App. 1937), and
State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, 167 So. 394, 400, 403 (Fla. 1936) (divided court striking
down price regulation for barber services), and Duncan v. City of Des Moines, 268
N.W. 547, 553 (Iowa 1936) (invalidating municipal ordinance fixing minimum prices
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to discipline the drycleaning sector proved somewhat more successful,' these decisions nevertheless cast considerable doubt on
the capacity of the New Deal to effect a revolution in the personal grooming industry."
One should, of course, never underestimate the importance of
good hygiene. Yet it bears emphasis that judges from across the
political spectrum repeatedly relied on Nebbia in decisions upholding other, arguably more significant aspects of state and
national programs for economic recovery and reform. In June of
1934, for example, a federal district judge in Missouri76 anticipated the Court's decision in the Gold Clause Cases," invoking
Nebbia in upholding federal legislation rendering "gold clauses"
in private contracts unenforceable." In August, a federal district
judge in neighboring Nebraska79 upheld price regulation under
the NIRA's Code of Fair Competition for the lumber industry, 0

for barbering services), and State ex rel. Pavlik v. Johannes, 259 N.W. 537, 538-39
(Minn. 1935) (divided court invalidating municipal ordinance prescribing opening and
closing hours for barber shops).
74. Compare United States v. Spotless Dollar Cleaners, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 725, 730
(S.D.N.Y. 1934) (relying on Nebbia in upholding price regulation under the NIRA's
Code of Fair Competition for the cleaning and dyeing trade), and Ex parte Lasswell,
36 P.2d 678, 681-82 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934) (relying on Nebbia in upholding conviction under state recovery act for, inter alia, cleaning and pressing clothes for less
than the prescribed minimum rate), with Kent Stores of New Jersey v. Wilentz, 14
F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.N.J. 1936) (invalidating state price regulation in the cleaning and
dyeing trade), and Wilentz v. Crown Laundry Serv., Inc., 172 A. 331, 332 (N.J. Ch.
1934) (noting that state may, in light of Nebbia, have authority to authorize price
regulation in the laundry business, but it must do so in "explicit, unambiguous language"). Judge John Clark Knox, a Wilson appointee, wrote Spotless, and William
Clark, a Coolidge appointee, wrote Kent Stores. See HAROLD CHASE ET AL., BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 50-51, 155, 370 (1976).
75. Not so in California. See Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 55 P.2d 177, 184-87
(Cal.) (relying on Nebbia, a divided court upheld resale price maintenance provisions
of state fair trade act as applied to cosmetics and toilet articles), affd, 299 U.S. 198
(1936).
76. Wilson appointee Charles Breckenridge Faris. See CHASE, supra note 74, at 8889, 369.
77. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S.
317 (1935); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
78. See In re Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 7 F. Supp. 1, 9 (E.D. Mo. 1934), affd sub
nom. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
79. The judge was FDR appointee James A. Donohue. See CHASE, supra note 74,
at 74, 372.
80. See United States v. Canfield Lumber Co., 7 F. Supp. 694, 697 (D. Neb.),
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while a colleague in the Eastern District of New Yorks1 sustained indictments for violations of the NIRA's Live Poultry
Code." In November, a federal district judge in California" upheld price regulation provisions of the NIRA's code for the motor
vehicle retailing trade;' Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge"
had sustained the New York State analog the preceding month.86
New York trial courts would sustain price regulation in the
coal industry twice before the year was out,8 7 and the sponsors
of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 similarly interpreted Nebbia as authorizing the statute's price regulation provisions." A federal district court opinion issued in November of

appeal dismissed, 76 F.2d 1003 (8th Cir. 1934).
81. This was Harding appointee Marcus B. Campbell. See CHASE, supra note 74,
at 41, 369.
82. See United States v. Schechter, 8 F. Supp. 136, 142, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1934), affd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76
F.2d 617 (2d Cir.), affd in part, rev'd in part, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). In May, Hoover
appointee E. Marvin Underwood, see CHASE, supra note 74, at 282, 371, had quoted
extensively from Nebbia in an opinion sustaining the NIRA's National Hosiery Code
against a Fifth Amendment challenge. See Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp, 7 F.
Supp. 139, 143 (N.D. Ga.), affd, 74 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1934).
83. The judge was Coolidge appointee Adolphus Frederic St. Sure. See CHASE,
supra note 74, at 244, 370.
84. See United States v. James W. McAlister, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 529, 533 (N.D. Cal.
1934).
85. 8 F. Supp. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), modified, 295 U.S. 89 (1935). Wilson appointee
Martin Thomas Manton wrote Spielman Motor Sales, and was joined by Hoover appointee Robert Porter Patterson and FDR appointee George Murray Hulbert. See
CHASE, supra note 74, at 133, 175, 216, 369, 371-72.
86. See Spielman Motor Sales, 8 F. Supp. at 439-40.
87. See Spaulding v. Kaminski, 276 N.Y.S. 663, 666 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934) (upholding provisions of state industrial recovery act establishing uniform standards of fair
competition pursuant to NIRA); Stokes v. Newtown Creek Coal & Coke Co., 275
N.Y.S. 290, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934) (upholding both NIRA and state act providing
for codes of fair competition); see also Sabatini v. Andrews, 243 A. 109, 114 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1934) (upholding state recovery act's adoption of national standards of fair
competition).
88. See H.R. REP. No. 74-1800, at 10 (1935) ("It is plain that the decision in the
Nebbia case by implication recognizes that there may be a national public interest in
any business, trade or industry."); 79 CONG. REc. 12,293 (1935) (statement of Rep.
Snyder) (citing Nebbia in support of the claim "[tihat the bituminous coal-mining
industry is affected with a national public interest and can be so declared and regulated by Congress seems obvious"). Even some opponents of the bill appeared to
concede that the coal business was "affected with a national public interest." H.R.
REP. No. 74-1800, at 55 (1935) (statement of Rep. Cooper); see id. at 59 (statement
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1935 agreed, upholding the Act's regulation of both prices and
wages." Even after the Court had reversed this decision in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,o observers remained hopeful that the
Court would sustain congressional price regulation in the coal
industry.9 Two days after the Court announced its decision,
Senator Joseph Guffey introduced a new coal bill.92 The revised
measure omitted the 1935 Act's labor regulation provisions, but
retained the price regulation provisions," the constitutionality of
which the Court had not considered separately. The bill passed
the House, but Congress adjourned before the Senate could take
up the measure." When Guffey reintroduced the bill in the next

of Rep. Knutson); see also Comment, The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935,
45 YALE L.J. 293, 311 (1935) (noting that the minimum wage controls and collective
bargaining features of the bill could be sustained in the context of the coal industry); cf 79 CONG. REC. 13,467 (1935) (statement of Rep. Church).
89. See R.C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, 12 F. Supp. 570, 593-94 (W.D. Ky. 1935).
FDR appointee Elwood Hamilton wrote the opinion. See CHASE, supra note 74, at
113-14, 372.
90. 298 U.S. 238, 317 (1936).
91. See Comment, 34 MICH. L. REV. 1167, 1178-79 (1936); Orval N. Thompson,
Note, Constitutional Law-The Guffey Coal Act Decision and the Future for Federal
Price Regulation, 16 OR. L. REV. 67, 71-79 (1936); Federal Legislation, The Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, 25 GEO. L.J. 986, 992-93 (1937); see also 81 CONG. REC. 2047
(1937) (statement of Rep. Casey); 81 CONG. REC. 2044 (1937) (statement of Rep.
Jenkins) (expecting the Court to sustain a bill that regulated prices in the coal industry); cf Recent Decision, 11 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 107, 109 (1936) (writing about
Carter Coal in the wake of Tipaldo: "The principal opinion purports to leave open
the question of federal price fixing. It would seem that price fixing in regard to
wages or fixing of hours bears no legal distinction from fixing of prices in the sale
of commodities. If one is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, the other is
also").
92. See 81 CONG. REc. 2950 (1937) (statement of Sen. Guffey).
93. See id.
94. See id.; RALPH HIILIS BAKER, THE NATIONAL BrrUMINOus COAL COMMISSION
63, 65 (1941); Thomas C. Longin, Coal, Congress and the Courts: The Bituminous
Coal Industry and the New Deal, 35 W. VA. HIST. 101, 123-24 (1974). Again, the
bill's sponsors relied on Nebbia. See S. REP. NO. 74-2370, at 8 (1936); H.R. REP. No.
74-2832, at 6, 8 (1936); 80 CONG. REC. 9620 (1936) (statement of Rep. Jenkins); 80
CONG. REc. 9613-15 (1936) (statement of Rep. Vinson) ("[]f Mr. Justice Roberts, who
wrote the opinion in the [Nebbial case in March 1934, had been willing to agree
that the price-fixing provisions in the Coal Act were invalid there would have been
no trouble in the Court knocking down the price-fixing features of the act, and I feel
that it is fair to assume that he refused to make the fifth member of the Court to
refuse the Congress the same power in relation to interstate commerce as he had
expressed for the Court was in the State of New York for intrastate commerce.").
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Congress, it passed the Senate by a vote of fifty-eight to fifteen"
and the House by a voice vote." Stripped of its provisions regulating production and employment relations at the mine, the
constitutionality of the bill was not seriously contested.97 Solicitor General Reed testified that he believed the bill was constitutional,98 as did future Chief Justice Fred Vinson. "[Als a member
of this House," the Kentucky Representative remarked,
I know the genuine respect that my colleagues here have for
the law and the courts. I have the same respect. As a lawyer
and a Member of this body, I say to you that we have tried to
square the language of this bill with the decisions of the
Supreme Court .... Our efforts have not been to circumvent
any opinion of our highest Court, but we have worked in a
bona-fide attempt to meet the law laid down by them in a
proper, legal, constitutional manner. 9
The bill could be constitutional only if sanctioned by Nebbia, in
which Vinson and his colleagues repeatedly took comfort."o As
Representative Jenkins reported, "great confidence is expressed
by the Attorney General's Department and others who vouch for
the constitutionality of this bill in the case of Nebbia v. New
York."o 1 "Mr. Justice Roberts wrote [the Nebbial opinion about a

Vinson and Jenkins made these remarks on June 16, 1936, more than two weeks
after 7paldo had been decided.
95. Seven Republicans joined eight Democrats in opposition. See 81 CONG. REC.
3145 (1937).
96. See 81 CONG. REc. 2128-29 (1937).
97. "The question of [the] constitutionality of the measure was not the storm center that it had been in 1935," reported Ralph Baker. BAKER, supra note 94, at 66.
"The House Ways and Means Committee had devoted considerable time to a discussion of the constitutional features, but apparently there was almost complete harmony in these discussions." Id. Some who had opposed the 1935 Act on constitutional
grounds announced their support for the revised bill, which they thought constitutional. See 81 CoNG. REC. 3014 (1937) (statement of Sen. McKellar); id. at 2048
(statement of Rep. McCormack).
98. See BAKER, supra note 94, at 66 (acknowledging, however, that "[rleports vary
on what the Solicitor General actually told the Committee").
99. 81 CONG. REc. 2032 (statement of Rep. Vinson); see also 81 CONG. REC. 2952
(1937) (statement of Sen. Guffey).
100. See H.R. REP. No. 75-294, at 11 (1937); S. REP. No. 75-252, at 4-5 (1937); id.
at 2953 (statement of Sen. Guffey); 81 CONG. REC. 2042 (statement of Rep. Jenkins);
id. at 2038-39 (statement of Rep. Vinson).
101. 81 CONG. REC. 2042 (statement of Rep. Jenkins) (citations omitted).
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year before the [Carter] case," Vinson observed."a' "Ifhe had any
change of mind relative to the power of Congress to regulate
prices and unfair methods of competition within its sphere,. it
would have been an easy matter to have invalidated those points
of the statute" on due process grounds.os For surely the four

Nebbia dissenters had been prepared to take that step. But
Sutherland's majority opinion had not. The majority had instead
held that the price regulation provisions were inseparable from
the offending labor provisions and therefore must fall as well.
Had Roberts believed that regulation of coal prices violated the
Due Process Clause, Vinson maintained, the majority would
have said so." Vinson and Jenkins made these remarks on
March 9, 1937; the House swept the bill to passage two days
later.10 s West Coast Hotel's March 29 "revolution" in due process
jurisprudence was still more than two weeks away.0
In several instances, state and federal courts did invalidate
state and national recovery acts on nondelegation or Tenth
Amendment grounds.' In opinions that actually reached the

102. 81 CONG. REC. 2039 (1937) (statement of Rep. Vinson).
103. Id.
104. See id.; see also S. REP. No. 75-252, at 5 (1937) ("In light of the decisions of
the Supreme Court, control of production is apparently beyond congressional power.
Consequently price regulation appears to be the only remaining means by which the
Congress can transform into order the chaos which for a generation has notoriously
ruled the bituminous coal industry of the Nation."); H.R. REP. No. 75-294, at 11
(1937) ("[Flour members of the Court [in Carter Coal] were of the opinion that the
price provisions were valid. The majority did not pass upon this question, but it will
be recalled that 2 years ago a strong opinion of the Court, delivered by Mr. Justice
Roberts, sustained the due process of price fixing in the regulation of the milk industry.").
105. See 81 CONG. REC. 2126 (1937).
106. Moreover, the bill's sponsors recognized that Nebbia could be linked with the
Shreveport Case (Houston, East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States), 234 U.S.
342 (1914), to extend federal regulatory authority of the price of intrastate sales of
coal as well. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 194-95.
107. See United States v. Eason Oil Co., 8 F. Supp. 365, 377 (W.D. Okla. 1934)
(invalidating provisions of Code of Fair Competition for the petroleum industry regulating drilling of oil wells as an effort to regulate purely intrastate activity, observing that "the fact that the state has power to fix intrastate prices or regulate intrastate business does not in any way justify the conclusion that Congress has the
same power, for the only power which Congress has to deal with commerce is to
regulate commerce 'among the several States'"), appeal dismissed, 79 F.2d 1013 (10th
Cir. 1935); United States v. Gearhart, 7 F. Supp. 712, 715-16 (D. Colo. 1934) (refusing to enjoin sale of coal at price below minimum NIRA code price, holding that
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due process issue, however, state and federal courts repeatedly
viewed Nebbia as authorizing wage and price regulation in a
variety of industries that the Court had never held to be affected
with a public interest. As the Court of Chancery of New Jersey
put it, Nebbia meant that:
[Ihf the legislative reason be the protection and welfare of the
people, it may regulate the price of any commodity ... in
price fixing of commodities, the commodity need not be affected with a public interest ... governments may, to insure
the safety and happiness, the comfort and welfare of its people, fix the price of any essential article.'08
A similar pattern can be found in cases involving regulation of
agriculture, in which courts occasionally found that state and
"the particular acts and conduct of the defendant here complained of do not restrain
or burden interstate commerce and are not subject to federal regulation," and distinguishing Nebbia by noting that while the police powers of the state are plenary, the
federal government "has no general police powers, but only such as are specifically
enumerated in the Constitution, and .. . the Ninth and Tenth Amendments reserve
all others to the states or the people"), appeal dismissed, 77 F.2d 1017 (10th Cir.
1935); United States v. Mills, 7 F. Supp. 547, 554, 559 (D. Md. 1934) (invalidating
provisions of the Code of Fair Competition for the petroleum industry regulating
local sales of gasoline on Tenth Amendment grounds); Hart Coal Corp. v. Sparks, 7
F. Supp. 16, 26 (W.D. Ky.) (invalidating provisions of the NIRA Bituminous Coal
Code regulating wages and hours of coal miners on Tenth Amendment grounds as a
scheme of regulation of "strictly local affairs," and distinguishing Nebbia as an exercise of the police power held by the states and not by the national government),
vacated, 74 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1934); Darweger v. Staats, 275 N.Y.S. 394 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1934) (invalidating state recovery act's regulation of coal on nondelegation
grounds), affd, 278 N.Y.S. 87 (N.Y. App. Div.), affd, 196 N.E. 61 (N.Y. 1935). But
see Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co. v. Nee, 12 F. Supp. 801, 805-06 (W.D. Mo. 1935)
(invalidating provisions of the National Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 on
Tenth Amendment grounds, and while noting that "[bly legislative flat the Congress
could not convert property used exclusively in private business into a public utility,"
not reaching the Fifth Amendment issue, because "even if [the coal industry was]
affected with a public interest, nevertheless these are matters reserved exclusively to
the states as the police power in such case would be involved and the national government is not authorized to enforce police regulations"); Darweger v. Staats, 196
N.E. 61, 67 (N.Y. 1935) (divided court striking down state recovery act's regulation
of coal on nondelegation grounds, and while not reaching the due process issue,
doubting "that the [Nebbial Case is an authority for the Legislature to fix the prices
of all commodities"). Albert L. Reeves, a Harding appointee, wrote Hume-Sinclair.
See CHASE, supra note 74, at 231, 370.
108. Wilentz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 172 A. 903, 904 (N.J. Ch. 1934) (invalidating
the New Jersey Code of Fair Competition for the Retail Rubber Tire Trade on unrelated grounds).
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federal programs transgressed federalism... or nondelegation"o
limitations. When such objections were not fatal, however,
Nebbia was typically sufficient to dispatch complaints that due
process had been denied. In April 1934, a federal district judge
in Illinois"z' brushed aside Commerce Clause and nondelegation
objections, holding that the Secretary of Agriculture had the
power to fix the price to be paid to producers for milk to be distributed in the Chicago market." Federal courts in Massachusetts"s and Missouri" invoked Nebbia in rejecting due process
objections to processing and other taxes imposed by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA). In February of 1936, after
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Butler,"' the

109. See, e.g., Royal Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 975, 978-80 (D. Md.
1934) (holding that the federal government is without constitutional power to regulate purely intrastate sales of milk); Douglas v. Wallace, 8 F. Supp. 379, 384-85
(W.D. Okla. 1934) (holding Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 unconstitutional
insofar as it attempted to regulate prices in purely local commerce, distinguishing
Nebbia on the ground that Congress has no police power and can exercise only enumerated powers).
110. See, e.g., Ferretti v. Jackson, 188 A. 474, 479-80 (N.H. 1936) (striking down
state milk control act as an improper delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency); Van Winkle v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 49 P.2d 1140 (Or. 1935) (invalidating act providing for execution of agricultural marketing agreements as unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, and by a divided court holding price regulation
of farm commodities beyond the state's police power, with only the dissent discussing
Nebbia); State v. Matson Co., 47 P.2d 1003, 1005-06 (Wash. 1935) (striking down
state milk control act as an improper delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency); Chas. Uhden, Inc. v. Greenough, 43 P.2d 983, 988 (Wash. 1935) (invalidating state agricultural a4justment act as an excessive delegation of legislative
authority, and while expressing "grave doubt" as to whether Nebbia authorized price
regulation of melons and tomatoes, finding that question "unnecessary here to determine"); Griffiths v. Robinson, 43 P.2d 977, 979 (Wash. 1935) (striking down state
milk control act as an improper delegation of legislative power to an administrative
agency).
111. The judge was FDR appointee William H. Holly. See CHASE, supra note 74, at
127, 372.
112. See United States v. Shissler, 7 F. Supp. 123, 126 (N.D. Ill. 1934).
113. See Franklin Process Co. v. Hoosac Mills Corp., 8 F. Supp. 552, 562 (D. Mass.
1934), rev'd sub nom. Butler v. United States, 78 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1935), affd, 297
U.S. 1 (1936). Writing for the court was Harding appointee Elisha Hume Brewster.
See CHASE, supra note 74, at 30, 369.
114. See Larabee Flour Mills Co. v. Nee, 11 F. Supp. 132, 133 (W.D. Mo. 1935).
Writing for the court was Harding appointee Albert L. Reeves. See CHASE, supra
note 74, at 231, 370.

115. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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Supreme Court of California relied heavily on Nebbia in upholding a state statute establishing a commission to regulate the
amounts of specified agricultural commodities that individual
producers would be permitted to harvest and prepare for market.1 ' Moreover, in September, well after the conclusion of the
Court's 1935 term, a federal district judge in Californiam made
Nebbia the centerpiece of his opinion upholding regulation of the
handling and shipment of oranges and grapefruit by the Secretary of Agriculture under the authority of the marketing provisions of the AAA."s The view that Nebbia provided a constitu116. See Agricultural Prorate Comm'n v. Superior Court, 55 P.2d 495, 508-10, 512
(Cal. 1936); see also Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 184
(1935) (invoking Nebbia in upholding California statute prescribing standards for
containers in which horticultural products were marketed).
117. FDR appointee Leon Rene Yankwich. See CHASE, supra note 74, at 373.
118. See United States v. Edwards, 16 F. Supp. 53, 54-55 (S.D. Cal. 1936), aff'd, 91
F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1937). The Edwards court observed that in Nebbia:
the power of the state to set up a mnimum price for a commodity was
sustained. In effect, the court there recognized it as within the power of
a state to exercise such control in the matter of prices as would result in
the abolition of "cut throat" competition and in the establishment of a
code of "fair" competition. Can it then be said that the plenary power of
the Congress to regulate commerce does not extend to the regulation of
quantities of products to be sent in interstate commerce? The regulation
of prices would have a much more direct bearing upon the production of
goods than the regulation of the quantities to be shipped in interstate
commerce. Such regulation would, according to ordinary economic principles, affect the entire price structure of the product, and would be felt
not only by the portion of the product in interstate commerce, but also
by the portion sold locally. It is an economic truism, that a stable price
structure affects production.. . . A regulation of prices must affect production directly. And yet such regulation is within the power to regulate
commerce.
How then, can it be said that the exercise of that power, when it
aims to limit the quantity of products to be shipped in interstate commerce, is invalid, as involving control over production?
To deny to Congress its plenary power over commerce, merely upon
the assumption that, in some indirect way, such control may induce persons to increase production voluntarily, would, if carried to its ultimate
conclusion, cripple and destroy the power.
Id. at 54.
After Tipaldo's reaffirmation of Adkins in early June, see Morehead v. New
York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 604 (1936) (noting that the petition did not question the validity of Adkins and, therefore, Adkins dictated the outcome in Tipaldo),
overruled in part by Olson v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313
U.S. 236 (1941), some opinions began to suggest that features of the
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tional foundation for such regulation was of course not idiosyncratic. The Act's advocates had taken the same position in the
House and Senate,1 19 where in 1935 it had passed by votes of
168-5212o and 64-15.121
Nebbia's ramifications for labor and employment law were
similarly manifest throughout 1936. In March, a federal district
judge for the Western District of New York 22 relied upon Nebbia
in upholding the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).12 In

Administration's agriculture program might violate the Fifth Amendment. That July,
in an opinion that would be reversed by the First Circuit the following year, Harding appointee Elisha Brewster, see CHASE, supra note 74, at 369, held that the
marketing provisions were inseparable from the unconstitutional provisions of the act
regulating agricultural production. See United States v. David Buttrick Co., 15 F.
Supp. 655, 658 (D. Mass. 1936), vacated, 91 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1937). Without reaching the due process issue, Judge Brewster did suggest a narrow reading of Nebbia:
"If it be conceded that the federal government may regulate the sale of and prices
for milk as a commodity affected with a public interest, it does not follow that such
powers would extend to all agricultural commodities." Id. (citations omitted). The
preceding year, Judge Brewster read Nebbia narrowly in United States v. Seven
Oaks Dairy Co., 10 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (D. Mass. 1935). Hoover appointee, Oscar
Raymond Lubring, see CHASE, supra note 74, at 371, followed Buttrick in Ganley v.
Wallace, 17 F. Supp. 115, 117-19 (D.D.C. 1936) (citing Adkins and TYpaldo for the
proposition that the plaintiffs had standing to maintain the suit, and invalidating an
order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture under the authority of the AAA as an
attempt to regulate agricultural production), rev'd, 95 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1938). In
Chester C. Fosgate Co. v. Eirkland, 19 F. Supp. 152 (S.D. Fla. 1937), Coolidge appointee Alexander Akerman, see CHASE, supra note 74, at 370, invoked Adkins and
Tipaldo in an opinion finding marketing agreement provisions of the AAA unconstitutional, primarily but not exclusively on Tenth Amendment and nondelegation
grounds. See Eirkland, 19 F. Supp. at 161, 163, 166.
119. See H.R. REP. No. 74-1241, at 10 (1935); 79 CONG. REC. 11,150-54, 11,158,
11,219 (1935) (statement of Sen. Bankhead); 79 CONG. REc. 11,154 (1935) (statement
of Sen. Black); 79 CONG. REC. 9485 (1935) (statement of Rep. Cooley); 79 CONG.
REC. 9461-62 (1935) (statement of Rep. Jones); see also Comment, Agricultural Adjustment and Marketing Control, 46 YALE L.J. 130, 141, 252 (1936) (noting the view
that the Nebbia rule would sustain the constitutionality of price control, or any
other regulation, as long as the regulation complied with the normal due process
requirements, regardless of any public interest element).
120. See 79 CONG. REC. 9595 (1935).
121. See id. at 11,658. Nine Democrats joined six Republicans in opposition. See id.
Here again the bil's sponsors recognized, as the Court would ultimately hold, that
Nebbia could be linked to the Shreveport Case to expand federal regulatory authority
over the prices of intrastate sales. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 203.
122. The judge was FDR appointee Harlan Watson Rippey. See CHASE, supra note
74, at 235, 373.
123. See Precision Castings Co. v. Boland, 13 F. Supp. 877, 887 (W.D.N.Y.), affd,
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July, after both Carter Coal and Tipaldo had been decided, a
three-judge panel of the Second Circuit's unanimously followed
suit, turning back a due process challenge to the Act's self-organization provisions. 2 s In April, a divided New York Court of
85 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1936).
124. The judges were Wilson appointee Martin Manton and Coolidge appointees
Thomas Walter Swan and Augustus Noble Hand. See CHASE, supra note 74, at 114,
175, 266,. 369-71.
125. See NLRB v. Associated Press, 85 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1936), affd, 301 U.S.
103 (1937). Similarly, again after Tipaldo had been decided, a unanimous Fourth
Circuit panel, consisting of Hoover appointee Morris Ames Soper and Coolidge appointees John Johnston Parker and Elliott Northcott, see CHASE, supra note 74, at
370-71, rejected a Fifth Amendment challenge to the Act's collective bargaining provisions. See NLRB v. Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co., 85 F.2d 990, 993-94 (4th
Cir. 1936). Brushing aside the contention that Adair v. United States and Coppage v.
Kansas were controlling, the court sustained the Act on the more recent authority of
Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks,
281 U.S. 548 (1930). See Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co., 85 F.2d at 993-94. In
the wake of Tipaldo, the same panel had unanimously sustained the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act against the claim that they violated the Fifth
Amendment. See Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 84 F.2d 641, 651-52 (4th
Cir. 1936), affd, 300 U.S. 513 (1937). And in Tipaldo's aftermath, a unanimous Fifth
Circuit panel, consisting of Wilson appointee Samuel Hale Sibley, Hoover appointee
Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., and FDR appointee Edwin Ruthven Holmes, see CHASE,
supra note 74, at 369, 371-72, had opined of the NLRA*
For a long period Congress has considered and legislated upon difficulties
relating to labor unions and strikes as burdening and impeding interstate
and foreign commerce. That they may be constitutionally regulated in
much the same way as this act proposes when affecting interstate railroad transportation was decided in [Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v.
Brotherhood].
Bradley Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 84 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1936) (citation omitted).
Some post-2paldo opinions did suggest that the Act violated the Fifth Amendment.
In Pratt v. Stout, 85 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1936), Hoover appointee John B. Sanborn,
see CHASE, supra note 74, at 371, although not opining on the constitutionality of
the NLRA, concluded that the trial court's conclusion that the Act, as applied to a
flour manufacturer, exceeded Congress's commerce power and abridged the
employer's Fifth Amendment rights was not "without substantial support." Pratt, 85
F.2d at 179. In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 87 F.2d 611 (9th Cir.
1937), rev'd, 304 U.S. 360 (1938), a divided court denied a petition for enforcement
of an NLRB order against the company. See id. at 631. Hoover appointee Curtis
Dwight Wilbur, see CHASE, supra note 74, at 3-11, wrote an opinion denying the
petition on the authority of Adair and Coppage. See Mackay Radio & Tel., 87 F.2d
at 626-27. He was unable, however, to persuade either of his colleagues on the panel
that the Act's provisions abridged Fifth Amendment rights. FDR appointee Clifton
Mathews, see CHASE, supra note 74, at 372, concurred in the judgment as a matter
of statutory interpretation, finding it unnecessary to reach the Fifth Amendment
issue. See Mackay Radio & Tel., 87 F.2d at 631 (Mathews, J., concurring). FDR ap-
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Appeals relied upon Roberts's 1936 elaboration of Nebbia in
Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyckl26 in upholding the
state's unemployment compensation insurance statute;127 in
December, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts invoked Nebbia and Borden's Farm Products in upholding the Bay
State's unemployment compensation law. 8 Between 1934 and
1936, a variety of commentators interpreted Nebbia to herald
the demise of Adkins v. Children's Hospital.m In April of 1936,

pointee Francis Arthur Garrecht, see CHASE, supra note 74, at 372, dissented, maintaining that Adair and Coppage had "been modified or overruled by the later case of
[Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks] . . . ." Mackay
Radio & Tel., 87 F.2d at 638 (Garrecht, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). For contemporary commentary doubting that Adair and Coppage survived Railway Clerks,
see Hearing on S. 1958 Before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 74th
Cong. 233 (1935) (statement of Professor Milton Handler), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 1613 (1949) [hereinafter
NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; Hearing on S. 1958 Before the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor, 74th Cong. 5253 (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in
NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 1428-29; NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra,
at 2338 (statement of Sen. Wagner); BERNARD C. GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 231-33 (1932); JOEL I. SEIDMAN, THE YELLOW
DOG CONTRACT 35 n.109 (1932); Edward Berman, The Supreme Court Interprets the
Railway Labor Act, 20 AM. ECON. REV. 619, 629-36 (1930); Osmond K. Fraenkel,
Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and Yellow Dog Contracts, 30 ILL. L.
REV. 854, 862 & n.46 (1936); E.F. Albertsworth, Comment, 25 ILL. L. REv. 307, 308
(1930); Comment, 40 YALE L.J. 92, 92-93 (1930); Henry K. Higginbotham, Recent
Case, Federal Protection of Collective Bargaining Under Railway Labor Act of 1926,
37 W. VA. L.Q. 101 (1930).
Several courts invalidated NLRB orders on the grounds that they regulated
local activity, without reaching the due process issue. See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 88 F.2d 154, 156 (1st Cir. 1937), rev'd, 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Foster Bros. Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 85 F.2d 984, 990 (4th Cir. 1936); Fruehauf Trailer Co.
v. NLRB, 85 F.2d 391, 392 (6th Cir. 1936), rev'd, 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 83 F.2d 998, 998-99 (5th Cir. 1936), rev'd, 301 U.S. 1
(1937); cf NLRB v. National N.Y. Packing & Shipping Co., 86 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir.
1936) (upholding NLRB order directed to an interstate packing and shipping concern).
126. 297 U.S. 251 (1936).
127. See W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 2 N.E.2d 22, 26 (N.Y. 1936).
128. See Howes Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts Unemployment Compensation Comm'n,
5 N.E.2d 720, 726, 728 (Mass. 1936).
129. See HUGH WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 736 (1936)
(predicting that O'Gorman and Nebbia are "a prophecy" that Adhins "will be overruled whenever a case giving the Supreme Court an opportunity to do so is presented to it"); Morris Duane, Government Regulation of Prices in Competitive Business,
10 TEMP. L.Q. 262, 264 (1936) (arguing that Nebbia "practically overruled a number
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of cases in which the Court had held state price fixing a violation of the (Dlue
[Pirocess [Cilause of the Fourteenth Amendment; also another number in which state
control of hours and wages had been declared invalid-a very similar problem");
Robert L. Hale, Minimum Wages and the Constitution, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 633
(1936) (suggesting that Nebbia had overruled Adkins); John E. Hannigan, Minimum
Wage Legislation and Litigation, 16 B.U. L. REV. 845, 865 (1936) ("[The Nebbia case
doctrine, if applied in the [Adkins] case, would have sustained the law."); Norman
Macbeth, Jr., Present Status of the Adkins Case, 24 KY. L.J. 59, 66 (1935) (positing
that had Hughes and Roberts "been on the [Clourt in 1923, it is highly improbable
that they would have concurred in the Adkins decision" and recognizing that in light
of O'Gorman and Nebbia, it seems "probable that they will now refuse to follow the
Adkins doctrine"); Alpheus Thomas Mason, Labor, the Courts, and Section 7(a), 28
AM. POL. Sol. REv. 999, 1008 (1934) (stating that Nebbia "augurs well for minimum
wage regulations"); Thomas Raeburn White, Constitutional Protection of Liberty of
Contract: Does It Still Exist?, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 425, 438, 440 (1935) (noting that
"[the Court] has in effect surrendered its power to declare void acts of legislature on
the ground that they infringe liberty of contract" and that state legislatures now
"may fix the rates of wages and the hours of labor"); Note, Nebbia v. People: A
Milestone, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 619, 622 (1934) (noting that the change wrought by
Nebbia is "so great as to overrule for all practical purposes a host of cases decided
in recent years under the due process clause;" it is now "possible that a state may
legally regulate all its businesses even to the extent of fixing prices, wages, and
hours of labor"); Francis W. Matthys, Recent Decision, 9 NOTRE DAME LAW. 468, 470
(1934) (asserting that Nebbia "clinch[ed] the battle"; "No longer may a man cry out
'Unconstitutional!' against every law that seems to restrict his freedom of contract or
to deprive him of his property.. . . The gateway to social legislation has at last
been opened. Labor laws, health laws, and other legislation that is sorely needed . . . now stand a good chance of being enacted"); Joseph H. Mueller, Recent Decision, 23 ILL. B.J. 89, 91 (1934) ("[Nebbial is noteworthy for it would scarcely be
denied from an economic standpoint that the regulation of wages, hours of labor,
etc., as well as price regulation invade the right of private property in a manner
clearly affecting price."); Recent Case, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 118 (1936) (stating
that wages "are but the price of a commodity which is sold to employers, and the
labor and health of women are easily as essential to the welfare of a state as is
milk. Therefore, if the dairy industry may be protected by minimum price laws, the
states should be permitted to extend similar aid to the far more helpless women
workers"); see also Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 635-36
(1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) (noting that "[Nebbia] should control the present case,"
because the decision and declaration in Nebbia are "irreconcilable with the decision
and most that was said in the Adkins case," and this has "left the Court free of
[Adkins] restriction as a precedent.... We should follow our decision in the Nebbia
case"); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 555 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting)
("[Tihe argument advanced here would support general prescription of prices for
farm products, groceries, shoes, clothing, all the necessities of modem civilization, as
well as labor, when some legislature finds and declares such action advisable and
for the public good."); Thomas C. Chapin, Stare Decisis and Minimum Wages, 9
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 297, 306 (1937) (stating that Nebbia had entailed "a liberal
ruling in the Morehead Case"); Paul Y. Davis, The Washington Minimum Wage Decision, 12 IND. L.J. 415, 417 (1937) ("It now seems clear that Mr. Justice Roberts'

1999]

LOST FIDELITIES

123

a unanimous Supreme Court of Washington signaled its agreement, relying heavily on Nebbia in an opinion sustaining the
state's minimum wage statute.1 30
Like some courts, some commentators read the due process
holding of Nebbia narrowly."31 But they were a distinct minority.

concurrence in an opinion so at variance with the principle of his own pronouncement in Nebbia v. New York was only obtained because of the supposed procedural
bar to a re-examination of the [Adkins] case."); Kurt Stern, Recent Interpretation by
the Supreme Court of Liberty of Contract in Employment Cases, 11 U. CIN. L. REV.
82, 89 (1937) (arguing that in view of Nebbia, "the real reason for the holding in
the Morehead case is the weight of stare decisis"); Olin L. Browder, Comment, 25
ILL. B.J. 284, 286 (1937) ("[C]onsidering the ground of decision in the Morehead
case, and considering also that it was Justice Roberts who wrote the opinion of the
Court in the Nebbia case, his switch to the liberal side [in Parrish] can be sufficiently explained without resorting to political explanations."); Comment, 25 ILL. B.J.
75, 76 (1936); Note, 22 IOWA L. REv. 565, 570-71 (1937); Comment, 34 MICH. L.
REV. 1180, 1187 (1936) ("[Ilt seems very difficult to understand why prices can be
fixed without violating due process, but wages cannot be. Both interfere with liberty
of contract."); Louis H. Rubenstein, Note, The Minimum Wage Law, 11 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 78, 82-83 (1936) (noting that in light of Nebbia, "one would have felt confident
that the New York Minimum Wage Law could successfully withstand charges of
unconstitutionality").
130. See Parrish v. West Coast Hotel Co., 55 P.2d 1083, 1089-90 (Wash. 1936),
affd, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
131. See Charles Bunn, Production, Prices, Incomes, and the Constitution, 11 Wis.
L. REV. 313, 316 (1936) ("[ln the Nebbia case as in all the other cases price fixing
has been sustained, the Court was careful to assemble special facts which seemed to
make price fixing in that particularindustry of particular importance to the public. I
believe that it is accurate to say, as the cases stand, that regulation of the price of
ordinary articles and services, in ordinary times, simply to affect the economic balance which our text lays down, and in the absence of peculiar facts creating a special situation in a single industry, is unconstitutional deprivation of liberty of business conduct."); Irving B. Goldsmith & Gordon W. Winks, Price Fixing: From Nebbia
to Guffey, 31 ILL. L. REV. 179, 201 (1936) ("A bare majority of the Supreme Court
decided to remove the public interest limitation, but that same bare majority has
done no more than to permit temporary price fixing under exceptional circumstances
on strong showing of fact."); Charles Grove Haines, Judicial Review of Acts of Congress and the Need for Constitutional Reform, 45 YALE L.J. 816, 841 (1936) (arguing
that cases such as Nebbia and Blaisdell, "though indicating a trend toward more
liberal criteria for the consideration of legislative acts, have been so interpreted as
to affect but little the scope of the field of public regulation"); Herbert T. Brunn,
Note, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 397, 397, 399 (1937) (arguing Nebbia's "broad implications . . . have been somewhat narrowed in recent United States Supreme Court
decisions .

. .

. The most recent cases leave doubtful the effect of the Nebbia case.

While it seems clear that price fixing is valid as long as the method adopted is
suitable and it is required by the general welfare, it is questionable whether a permanent statute will be upheld since the court has lately been emphasizing the emer-
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Most observers, while occasionally cautious, read Nebbia far
more broadly.182

gency feature of price fixing legislation."); Louis Paul Haffer, Note, 16 B.U. L. REV.
775, 778 (1936) (discussing cases invalidating resale price maintenance statutes as
applied to cosmetics and noting that "the Nebbia case may be reconciled by the not
easily dispelled assertion that the legislation which [Nebbial declared valid was either passed for a compelling emergency, or to control an essential element of human
existence"); Louis Paul Haffer, Note, 16 B.U. L. REV. 506, 513 (1936) (suggesting
that Nebbia was "concerned merely with emergency measures with respect to emergency goods"); Theodore Woodrow Kheel, Legislation, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 445, 447 n.13
(1937) ("While the [Nebbial case was taken to mean that the Legislature could fix
prices of commodities not necessarily 'affected with the public interest,' it could not
be taken to mean that the Legislature could fix all prices."); Recent Decision, 11 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 104, 105, 107 (1936) ("[Tlhe recent decision of [Tipaldo] dealing with
the New York minimum wage statute makes the applicable scope of the Nebbia case
seem doubtful. . . . As indicated by the Mayflower Farms case, the court may narrow its decision in the Nebbia case to a point of ineffectiveness by rejection of detailed regulations which are numberless in some industries, particularly the milk
industry."); Recent Decision, 10 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 319, 319 (1936) ("The legislature
may not fix the prices nor regulate the rates of an industry not intimately affected
with the public interest."); Recent Case, 8 TEMP. L.Q. 422, 426 (1934) (concluding
that "the legislature may fix prices only when the business involved is 'affected with
a public interest'"); Note, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 331 (1935) ("[The liberal [Nebbial
decision [may] not be applied as extensively as has been suggested.").
132. See, e.g., Due Process and the Nebbia Case, 20 A.B.A. J. 225 (1934) ("The
significance of the decision with respect to various provisions of the National Recovery Program will hardly be overlooked."); George J. Feldman, Legal Aspects of Federal and State Price Control, 16 B.U. L. REV. 570, 591-93 (1936) (maintaining that
"[tihe legality under the 'due process clause' of the prices fixed depends in each case
on the particular circumstances involved," and therefore "[iut is not proper to conclude from the Nebbia case that a legislature may now at any time regulate the
selling price of any and all commodities," but asserting nevertheless that Nebbia "is
extremely important because it lays down a new conception of public interest in
business and opens the door to legislative regulation of prices and production in
those industries in which the legislature can reasonably find from the surrounding
economic facts and conditions that the public welfare requires the regulation, provided the statute is not arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory"); Robert L. Hale, The
Constitution and the Price System: Some Reflections on Nebbia v. New York, 34
COLUM. L. REv. 401, 404, 422, 424 (1934) ("The Nebbia case does repudiate the doctrines announced in some other recent decisions.... The majority of the Court did
not confine its discussion to the power to fix minimum prices in the particular circumstances of the case, but discussed the constitutionality of price fixing generally. . . . As a result of the Nebbia case, the horizontal limit has been removed from
price fixing."); Thomas P. Hardman, Public Utilities I. The Quest for a Concept-Another Word, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 230, 238 (1934) (arguing that Nebbia "seems to
stand for the proposition that there is no difference, legally speaking, between the
kind of control that is exercised over so-called businesses affected with a public
interest and the control exercised over so-called private businesses"); Frank E.
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Horack, Jr., & Julius Cohen, After the Nebbia Case: The Administration of Price
Regulation, 8 U. CIN. L. REV. 219, 231-32 (1934) (arguing that after Nebbia, the
Court "may now look to the reasonableness of the regulation and does not have to
filter reasonability through the judicial screens already clogged with the remains of
Wolff Packing v. Industrial Commission, the Adkins case, the Tyson case, and many
others.. . . If the Nebbia case expresses the policy of the court, then the future will
see judicial inquiry directed toward the 'reasonableness of price' and not toward the
initial competency to regulate. This will leave to the legislature (for the most part)
the problem of policy. . . ." ); Robert M. Kerr, Price Fixing and Marketing Regulations, 15 OR. L. REV. 46, 50, 51 (1935) ("It would seem, therefore, that the Nebbia
Case has significance far beyond the particular commodity there involved. It lends
support to the proposition that agriculture and each of its branches are industries
'subject to control for the public good,' the prosperity of which is [al legitimate concern of the state.... The Supreme Court having at last recognized that the police
power is competent to deal with any business, using all of the necessary weapons,
including price control, to protect the public interest, there would appear now to
remain only the question of wherein lies the public interest in relation to any particular commodity or industry affected. And that, of course, is primarily a matter for
the legislative branch of the government to determine as the occasion arises."); Robert A. Maurer, Due Process and the Supreme Court-A Revaluation, 22 GEO. L.J.
710, 711 (1934) (discussing "the recent New York Milk case, in which the Supreme
Court is thought by some to have turned its back upon prior decisions, and to have
indicated an intention to allow social and economic legislation to be enforced untrammeled by any constitutional limitation heretofore supposed to exist in the [Dlue
([Pirocess [Cilause"); Regulation of Milk Industry Valid Says Highest Court, 40 CASE
& CoM. 2, 3 (1934) ("[]t is possible that this decision heralds a return to the concepts of an earlier day when due process was less burdensome on state action than
the decisions of the last quarter of a century would seem to indicate."); J. Louis
Warm, The Rationale of Price Fixing Under the Codes, 8 U. CIN. L. REv. 529, 533
n.13 (1934) ("All of the reasoning which the court uses, all of the facts which it
presents are as valid for normal economic periods, so-called, as for emergencies. The
public is entitled to the same protection under any conditions."); White, supra note
129, at 438 (1935) ("[IUt would seem clear [after Nebbial that Congress or the state
legislatures (so far as the due process clauses are concerned), may fix maximum
prices for the sale of commodities of all kinds.. .. If they may fix maximum prices,
they may also fix minimum prices. They may provide that the employees of industry
must belong to unions or they may forbid them to belong to unions.... They may
limit the output of the manufacturer or farmer and determine the kind and character of product he shall make or grow."); Thela F. Call, Note, Legislative Control of
the Milk Industry, 3 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 494, 500, 505 (1935) ("The case of Nebbia
v. New York can best be explained by realizing that the courts are recognizing the
principle that the policy of noninterference in private business must yield to the
policy of regulation when it is to the interest of society at large.. . . While it is a
general maxim that the federal government does not have power to regulate intrastate commerce, yet when it is so mingled with interstate commerce that one cannot
be regulated without the other, there is ample authority for the proposition that
Congress has the requisite power. There is no question as to the power to regulate
interstate commerce, and the only limitation is the 5th Amendment. The Nebbia
Case seems to have settled that question as far as recovery legislation is con-
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cerned."); Note, Constitutionality of the New York Fair Trade Act, 22 VA. L. REV.
556, 559-62 (1936) ("In the now famous New York Milk Case the court executed a
surprising volte face ... the phrase [affected with a public interest] was effectively
emasculated... . The effect of the Nebbia Case seems to be to put governmental
price control on the same footing as all other social legislation. . . . In the passage
of economic legislation, as elsewhere, the due process clause requires only that the
exercise of the police power be not arbitrary nor discriminatory."); William M. Krug,
Note, 14 B.U. L. REV. 396, 397 (1934) ("Instead of using the emergency as a basis
for the validity of the statute, the court upheld the measure on the ground that it
was a valid exercise of the police power. The court deliberately went out of its way
to remove the so-called 'affected with a public interest test' as a basis of permissible
price regulation from our law. A reading of the broad and definite language of the
decision prevents one from reaching any other conclusion."); Corlett McClennan,
Comment, Can a State Regulate Prices at a Private Industry?, 9 IND. L.J. 522, 525,
529 (1934) ("[It seems clear that the Milk Case gives us some new law directly
overruling the dogma of the previous cases and introduces an era of governmental
regulation.... The decision removes a great deal of uncertainty as to the price
fixing provisions of the 'New Deal' legislation and it is the opinion of the writer that
those provisions will not meet with much difficulty if the court finds that price control is an effective method of protecting the paramount social interests involved.");
Comment, 34 MICH. L. REV. 691, 697-98 (1936) ("Certain it is that the now famous
case of Nebbia v. New York has cast considerable doubt upon all those decisions
which established for price legislation a different standard than for other forms of
business regulation; for the court, in that opinion, appears definitely to have gone
out of its way to remove the 'affected with a public interest' test as a basis of permissible price fixing."); Note, 13 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 275 (1936) (citing Nebbia for
the proposition that, "[allthough not all authorities are agreed as to the efficacy of
price maintenance, the courts, in determining whether such legislation is warranted
may not, if the question is a controversial one, substitute their own economic views
for those of the legislature"); Norman Parker, Note, Nebbia v. New York and Business Affected with the Public Interest, 19 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 202, 209 (1934)
("[Glovernmental regulation is sustainable when the competitive system has broken
down as a means of substantially protecting both the buyer and the seller. The
legislative determination of the feasibility of the means adopted to attain a designated end is viewed more as a finality; it is less open to judicial inquiry, especially
from the point of view of substance, than has been the tendency hitherto."); Note,
Price Fixing and Due Process of Law, 19 IOwA L. REV. 577, 580 (1934) ("Taking into
consideration the language of this opinion and the alignment of the court, it seems
from the result that the majority of the court are tending towards acceptance of the
position of Justice Holmes in the Tyson case; that price fixing in itself does not
violate any concept of due process; and that regulation by the legislature is permissible in any business without regard to affectation with a public interest if regulation is reasonable, in the sense of having any relation to the end, for the public
good."); William A. Reppy, Comment, 9 S. CAL. L. REV. 370, 373 (1936) ("[The
Nebbia case took a position even further advanced than the dissents in the previous
cases. The existence of separate business categories was flatly denied, as was the
notion that there is something peculiarly sacrosanct about prices."); Comment, 7 S.
CAL. L. REV. 325, 330 (1934) ("The Nebbia case leaves the responsibility of the regulation of public affairs with state legislatures. The Supreme Court is no longer a
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Committee of Nine to settle the economic problems of the States."); George M.
Snellings, Jr., Comment, Liquidation of the Public Utility Concept: The Decision in
Nebbia v. New York, 8 TUL. L. REV. 442, 448, 449, 451 (1934) ("Certainly the import of this latest opinion is clear beyond a doubt. . . . [Nebbia offers] a present
promise of more liberal presumptions in favor of the validity of social and economic
experimentation through organized government at a time when the exigencies of the
situation imperatively demand some positive effort on the part of government.. . . It
may, therefore, be respectfully suggested that the Supreme Court of the United
States is now prepared to consider with willing hearts and open' minds cases involving the constitutionality of the operation of such enactments as the National Industrial Recovery Act or the Agricultural Adjustment Act, with 'every possible
presumption' to obtain in favor of their validity."); Note, Some ConstitutionalProblems Arising out of Federal and State Control of Milk, 34 CoLum. L. REV. 1336,
1337-38 (1934) ("The recognition in Nebbia v. New York of the power of a state to
regulate retail milk prices marked a departure from the accepted theory that price
regulation was permissible only as to business 'affected with a public interest' or
'devoted to a public use.' Under the doctrine of that case, freedom from price fixing
is to enjoy no special sanctity, but price like other regulation will be valid when
reasonable."); Note, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 619, 621-22 (1934) ("[The Court has not relied on the economic emergency or the temporary character of the legislation, but
has gone much further and has placed the decision solely on the ground that the
state has a right to pass price fixing legislation as part of its police power whenever
the welfare of its citizens reasonably demands it . . . all businesses may be subject
to the exercise of the police power if the legislature reasonably states that the public
welfare is involved.... The decision marks the change from an era of laissez-faire
to an era of governmental regulation."); Note, 20 VA. L. REV. 887, 891 (1934)
("Granted the power to legislate for the general welfare, the conclusion of the court
that price fixing legislation which is not 'arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably
irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt' is permissible in any industry seems logically inevitable."); Legislation, Fair Trade Legislation: The Constitutionality of a State Experiement in Resale Price Maintenance, 49 HARV. L. REV. 811, 816
(1937) (arguing that although Nebbia "may be assimilated, by a process of attrition,
to cases justifying price fixing in an 'emergency,' the face value of its language indicates such a reversal of Supreme Court policy as to remove the former ban which
rendered legislative price setting of ordinary commodities per se invalid, and to make
reasonableness alone the determinant of validity"); Recent Decision, 24 GEO. L.J.
1011, 1012 (1936) ("The great importance of the Nebbia case ... is that it establishes the principle that it is not required that business be affected with a public interest to be subject to the states' regulatory power, and concludes that the private
character of a business does not prevent the state from regulating prices."); Recent
Decision, 22 GEO. L.J. 614, 616 (1934) ("The decision has been widely heralded for
the bearing it may have upon the future of national emergency legislation," and
"might fairly be interpreted to mean that there is nothing invalid in the N.RA and
the A.A.A. as far as due process, interference with liberty of contract, or deprivation
of private property are concerned"); Recent Cases, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 404, 407
(1934) ("[Tlhe several references made by the Court to the Fifth Amendment and the
regulatory powers of the Federal Government appear to be more than mere fortuitous dicta, and probably indicate the future attitude of the Court as to problems of
due process arising out of Federal legislation."); Recent Decision, 34 MICH. L. REV.
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The foregoing data would appear to be difficult to reconcile
with the recent claim that neither "lower court judges" nor other
"serious" contemporary observers viewed Nebbia as creating farreaching new regulatory opportunities for state and national
government.xas

1241, 1242 n.9 (1936) (stating that it is "usually thought that Nebbia v. New York
did away with this artificial [affected with a public interest] standard"); Recent Decision, 33 MIcH. L. REV. 961, 962 (1935) ("The constitutionality of price fixing per se
in industries not traditionally 'affected with a public interest' may now be a matter
of history."); Legislation, Milk Regulation: A Problem in Economics, Legislation, and
Administration, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 247, 250 (1934) ("By a brave leap, the majority discarded the empty concept of 'business affected with a public interest' as the test of
price regulation, for an enlarged concept of the police power. Apparently, 'price' will
now be included with other police power regulation when its control is vital to the
status of a large economic class or of society itself."); Recent Case, 18 MINN. L. REV.
874, 875 (1934) ("[The Supreme Court did not make the validity of the statute dependent on the existence of a general economic emergency."); Richard F. Mooney, Recent Decision, 18 MARQ. L. REV. 198, 199 (1934) ("In rediscovering Munn v. Illinois
the court renounces the laissez-faire philosophy of the cases which had given so
narrow a construction to the phrase, 'affected with a public interest.' As the law now
stands, a business is affected with a public interest, so as to be subject to the exercise of the police power, when the legislature reasonably determines that regulation
is for the best interests of the people as a whole."); Joseph H. Mueller, Recent Decision, 23 ILL. B.J. 89, 91 (1934) ("[Nebbial has the virtue of opening the way for a
pragmatic examination of each individual case on its merits and enabling the court
to uphold whatever laws the needs of an ever-changing society may demand. In view
of recent momentous changes in our social and economic structure the importance of
this is significant."); Recent Decision, 9 NOTRE DAME LAW. 468, 469 (1934) ("It is
evident that in the principal case the Supreme Court has overruled its former decisions."); Recent Case, 11 TEMP. L.Q. 100, 101, 103 (1936) ("[The effect of this
[Nebbial decision is far-reaching and indeterminate.... [D]ue to the alacrity with
which some of the courts have accepted the Nebbia ruling, one is tempted to foresee
the elimination of major abuses in other industries by governmental price control
based upon the principles enunciated in the milk control cases."); Recent Case, 9
TEMP. L.Q. 95, 97-98 (1934) ("The Nebbia case has definitely rejected the public
interest test. . . . This is a distinct departure from the decided cases, [and is] strong
evidence of the course the court is likely to follow" in cases involving price regulation under the amended AAA); see also supra note 129 (interpreting Nebbia to signal
the demise of Adkins).
133. Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279, 2335
(1999). Ackerman's assertion is unashamedly categorical. By contrast, the spirited
student article upon which he relies (which was prepared under Ackerman's direction) acknowledges a small fraction of the sources marshalled here, dismissing them
as idiosyncratic while overlooking the balance of the evidence impeaching this particular Ackermanian conceit. See David A. Pepper, Against Legalism: Rebutting an
Anachronistic Account of 1937, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 63, 63 (1998) (offering Professor
Ackerman "deep thanks for his active and enthusiastic . guidance throughout this
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III. LOST FIDELITIES, 1934-1940

Returning from the broader constitutional culture to the Supreme Court, we find that there were cases decided between
1934 and 1937 in which Hughes or Roberts joined opinions invalidating statutory provisions on the ground that they violated
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. These cases involved the
interpretation of either the same clause (due process) or at least
the same amendment (the Fourteenth) as that implicated in
Nebbia. It is therefore entirely appropriate to suggest that they
might require somewhat more explanation than do post-Nebbia
cases decided on federalism or separation of powers grounds. Yet
Hughes and Roberts clearly believed at the time that their votes
in these cases were consistent with Nebbia. Moreover, they continued to adhere to the substantive positions articulated in those
cases even after they had voted to uphold the minimum wage in
Parrish.
Three cases are of particular interest: Railroad Retirement
Board v. Alton Railroad Co., Colgate v. Harvey,'a and Mayflower Farms Inc. v. Ten Eyck.'a Each of these cases illustrates

project"). Both suffer from regrettable inattention to doctrinal nuance and the voting
behavior of individual Justices. See infra note 221.
134. 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
135. 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
136. 297 U.S. 266 (1936). For the present, I leave to one side cases in which the
decision to invalidate a statute was unanimous. See, e.g., Treigle v. Acme Homestead
Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1936); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295
U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 63 (1935);
W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 434 (1934). Such decisions serve only to
demonstrate that even Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo, who along with many others
maintained that Nebbia was the controlling authority in the minimum wage cases,
believed that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Contracts
Clause, still imposed some substantive limits on governmental power. The "Three
Musketeers," like Hughes and Roberts, apparently saw their votes in Nebbia and
Parrish as consistent with their votes in these cases. Unless we are prepared to
embrace the novel contention that Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo "switched" in 1937,
the ostensible contrast between Parrish and these unanimous decisions cannot advance the case for the view that Hughes or Roberts underwent such a conversion.
For similar reasons I leave aside cases decided in 1937 and thereafter in which
the decision to uphold a statute was unanimous. See, e.g., Townsend v. Yeomans,
301 U.S. 441, 459 (1937); Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 324
(1937); National Fertilizer Ass'n v. Bradley, 301 U.S. 178, 181 (1937); Wright v.
Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937);
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an incontrovertible fact: Nebbia was not Ferguson v. Skrupa.'
This is not to minimize Nebbia's importance, but simply to understand more precisely the nature of its importance. In abandoning the public/private distinction, Nebbia did not remove the
requirement that regulations of business be reasonable, that is,
not arbitrary or discriminatory. As Alton, Colgate, and Mayflower illustrate, that standard was not as relaxed in the hands of
Hughes and Roberts in 1935 and 1936 as it eventually came to
be. But the standard came to be more relaxed not because
Hughes and Roberts changed, but because the Court did.
In Alton, Justice Roberts bludgeoned the Railroad Retirement
Act of 1934 to death. Before declaring that the Act was not a
regulation of commerce within the meaning of Article I, Section
8, Roberts had declared several of its provisions unconstitutional
on the ground that they deprived employers of their property
without due process of law.13 Although this was far from a
whole-hearted embrace of the welfare state, the holding was at
the same time hardly a repudiation of Nebbia. Railroads were,
after all, the paradigmatic businesses affected with a public
interest. Their rates had long been subject to regulation. 3 9 Before Nebbia, only specified businesses affected with a public
interest had been subject to certain types of regulation. By abandoning the business affected with a public interest limitation,
Nebbia dramatically enlarged the category of businesses subject
to those types of regulation. Even with respect to businesses

Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258, 267 (1937); Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas
City Power & Light Co., 300 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1937); Hauge v. Chicago, 299 U.S.
387, 392 (1937). Such decisions advance the view that Hughes and Roberts switched
only if we accept the novel proposition that the Four Horsemen switched as well.
For an explanation of the differing results in Radford and Wright, see Barry
Cushman, The Hughes Court and Constitutional Consultation, 1998 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
79, 81-84.
Finally, I also leove to one side Morehead u. New York ex rel. 7paldo, 298 U.S.
587 (1936), which I discuss in detail in CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 92-104.
137. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
138. See Alton, 295 U.S. at 348-60.
139. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017 (1998) (discussing the relationship between the regulation of railroads in the late 19t century and current theories
of economic regulation).
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affected with a public interest, however, the government's regulatory power had never been without limits; and Nebbia did not
purport to lift those limits. So while Chief Justice Hughes filed a
vigorous dissent, nowhere did he assert that the majority's ruling was inconsistent with Nebbia. In fact, Hughes didn't even
cite the case.1'
There are several things to note about Alton. First, it did not
stand as an insuperable obstacle to the enactment of an effective
federal pension statute for railway workers. Shortly after the
Court announced the decision, Congress went to work to frame a
pension statute based not on the commerce power, but instead
on the powers to tax and spend. By the summer of 1937, congressional leaders and administration officials had crafted a
formulation acceptable to the major railroads and railway unions, and embodied it in the Carrier Taxing Act of 1937141 and
the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937.142 Representatives of the
railroads and the brotherhoods promised not to contest the constitutionality of the legislation, and "to use their influence
against having anyone else bring such action."' And they delivered. The pension system they created remains with us in
modified form today."
Second, even the Alton dissenters found that one of the
statute's provisions violated the Due Process Clause. "I agree,"
wrote Hughes, "with the conclusion that the requirement that
the carriers shall pay retiring allowances to [all workers in service one year prior to the enactment, although they might never
be re-employed] is arbitrary and beyond the power of Congress."14 No one from the Nebbia majority took the position that

140. For a similar view, see Richard D. Friedman, Switching 7me and Other
Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 1891, 1929 (1994).

141. Ch. 405, 50 Stat. 435 (1937) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 261-273
(1946)).
142. Pub. L. No. 75-167, 50 Stat. 307 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 231231v (1994)).
143. 81 CONG. REC. 6087 (1937) (statement of Mr. Mapes); see Cushman, supra
note 136, at 90 & n.114.
144. I tell this story in greater detail in Cushman, supra note 136, at 88-91 &
nn.89-116.
145. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 389 (1935) (Hughes,
C.J., dissenting).
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the Due Process Clause no longer constrained economic regulation.
Third, in light of the unanimity with which the Court had
upheld the Railway Labor Act in 1930, the decision in Alton cast
no shadow over the collective bargaining provisions of the Wagner Act.' Regulation of collective bargaining clearly was within
congressional power when the business in question was engaged
in interstate commerce and affected with a public interest. This
was borne out by the unanimity with which the Court sustained
the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act in March of
1937.147 The Court again confirmed the constitutionality of such
regulation when it unanimously sustained the application of the
Wagner Act to an interstate bus company the following month.'s
The Four Horsemen dissented in each of the manufacturing
cases because they denied that the commerce power authorized
congressional regulation of labor relations in such enterprises,
and, having dissented in Nebbia, they insisted that the businesses in question were private.'49 They did not maintain that government could not impose such labor regulations on businesses
affected with a public interest.5 o
But what of Alton's status after 1937? Wasn't it effectively
overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish?''Consider United
States v. Carolene Products Co.,152 in which the Court held that
a federal statute prohibiting interstate shipment of "filled
milk"' was both within the power of Congress to regulate in-

146. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. H§ 151-169 (1994)).
147. See Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 563 (1937).
148. See Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142, 146 (1937).
149. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 76 (1937)
(McReynolds, J., dissenting).
150. Cf. Laura Kalman, Law Politics and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165,
2188 (1999) ("[Slo long as we read Leuchtenburg's marvelous essay about Justice
Roberts's 'almost medieval' conception of '"the relation of employer and employee' in
[Alton] ... ,it will remain difficult for us to understand the Justice Roberts of two
years later without finding any explanation other than politics convincing.").
151. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
152. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
153, Filled Milk Act, ch. 262, 42 Stat. 1486 (1923) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 61-64 (1994)).
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terstate commerce and consistent with due process." The most
celebrated portions of Justice Stone's opinion appear under the
heading "Third." Here one finds both the famous Footnote Four
and the oft-quoted passage setting forth a deferential standard
of review in cases involving economic regulation. "[Riegulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions," wrote
Stone, "is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in light
of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.""' 5 Less often quoted are a series of passages in this same
part in which Stone fleshed out and qualified this famous formulation.15 For present purposes, we need consider only one:
[Wle recognize that the constitutionality of a statute, valid on
its face, may be assailed by proof of facts tending to show
that the statute as applied to a particular article is without
support in reason because the article, although within the
prohibited class, is so different from the others of the class as
to be without the reason for the prohibition.'
The citation for this proposition?: "RailroadRetirement Board v.
Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 349, 351, 352 [(1935)]. "158 The cited
pages are those of Roberts's opinion for the majority.

154. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 148, 154.
155. Id. at 152.
156. Stone stated:
We may assume for present purposes that no pronouncement of a legislature can forestall attack upon the constitutionality of the prohibition
which it enacts by applying opprobrious epithets to the prohibited act,
and that a statute would deny due process which precluded the disproof
in judicial proceedings of all facts which would show or tend to show
that a statute depriving the suitor of life, liberty or property had a rational basis.
Id.
Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice,
such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry, and the
constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular
state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts
have ceased to exist.
Id. at 153 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 153-54.
158. Id. at 154.
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What on earth was a citation to Alton, a decision vilified in
the law review literature,' doing in the opinion announcing the
triumph of deferential review? In 1935, Stone had declared that
"the decision in the Railroad Retirement Act was the worst performance of the Court in my time,"'0 even "about the worst
performance of the Court since the Bake Shop Case [Lochner v.
New York]."161 What could have induced him to invoke a precedent he detested? Consider the vote in Carolene Products.
McReynolds dissented without opinion.162 Butler wrote a separate opinion concurring only in the result." Cardozo did not
participate, nor did Reed, who had replaced Sutherland. That
left only five Justices in the majority. Like Stone, Hughes and
Brandeis had dissented in Alton. Certainly they had no interest
in recognizing that the majority opinion had any continuing
vitality. But Justice Roberts apparently did. He was, after all,
the only member of the CaroleneProducts majority who was also
in the Alton majority. While unfortunately we have no record of
intracurial correspondence that would shed light on this question, it is difficult to explain the citation to Alton as anything
other than an accommodation to Roberts. And it could be an
accommodation to Roberts only if he continued to believe that
the case had been decided correctly. The citation certainly was
not the idea of the fifth member of the majority, Hugo Black.
The published report of the case noted that Black "concurs in
the result and in all of the opinion except the part marked
'Third.'"" The sole New Dealer in the majority did not join the
159. See, e.g., Thomas Reed Powell, Commerce, Pensions and Codes, 49 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8-24 (1935); Bruce R. Trimble, The Judicial Treatment of the New Deal, 4
KAN. CITY L. REv. 104, 106 (1936); Note, 25 GEO. L.J. 161, 172-73 (1936); William
H. Quasha, Note, The Railroad Retirement Acts, 10 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 53, 57-58
(1935); Recent Decision, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 498, 500-01 (1935); cf, Comment, 33
MICH. L. REv. 1214, 1219-24 (1935); 20 MINN. L. REV. 49, 49-56 (1935) (reviewing

the Alton decision).
160. Letter from Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Thomas Reed Powell (May 31,
1935), quoted in MASON, supra note 1, at 397.
161. Letter from Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Justice Felix Frankfurter
(May 9, 1935), quoted in WIILIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN
48 (1995).

162. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 155.
163. See id. at 155 (Butler, J., concurring).
164. See id.
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portion of the opinion in which the Court articulated the famous
"deferential standard.""' For Black recognized that the rational
basis test adopted by the majority was not the rational basis test
as we have come to understand it." No rational basis test that
was informed by Roberts's Alton opinion could be.167
The second case illustrating Nebbia's limitations is Colgate v.
Harvey,'"e in which the Court rejected claims that two of the provisions of the Vermont Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1931
violated the Equal Protection and Privileges or Immunities
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment."6 ' But Sutherland's
opinion for the majority, which Hughes and Roberts joined, did
hold that a third provision, which treated interest income from
money loaned within the state more favorably than income from
money loaned outside the state, violated the same clauses.7 o
"The test to be applied in such cases as the present one," wrote
Sutherland, "is: Does the statute arbitrarily and without genuine reason impose a burden upon one group of taxpayers from
which it exempts another group, both of them occupying substantially the same relation toward the subject matter of the
legislation?"7 Applying that test, the majority found wanting

165. See ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK 276-77 (1994).
166. See Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone
(Apr. 21, 1938), reprinted in Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1109 (1982) ("As I read the opinion in connection
with the cases cited, it approves the submission of proof to a jury or a court under
certain circumstances to determine whether the legislature was justified in the policy
it adopted.") (emphasis added). Lusky scores as a 'misconception ... the notion that
the Footnote calls for denial of strict scrutiny in all cases involving property rights
or economic interests." Lusky, supra, at 1105; ef BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 489-90 n.45 (1998) ("The real surprise was Black, who refused-without ... giving any reasons-to join the crucial section of Stone's opinion.").
167. "Would you ever hold any statute unconstitutional on grounds of substantive
due process?" Stone wrote to Black. Letter from Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to
Justice Hugo L. Black (Apr. 22, 1938), quoted in NEWMAN, supra note 165, at 277.
"If not, then of course you could not agree with the third [section] in the opinion in
the Carolene case." See id.
168. 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
169. See id. at 416-22, 434-36.
170. See id. at 433.
171. Id. at 423.
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the provision in question.'7 2 Because the classification was
"based upon a difference having no substantial or fair relation to
the object of the act," it worked a "discrimination" that was
"arbitrary."7 3 Justice Stone, joined by Justices Brandeis and
Cardozo, published a dissent that ran to fourteen printed pages
in the U.S. Reports.' 74 The dissent summoned a spate of authorities in support of the validity of the classification, scoring the
claim that the statute violated "the almost forgotten privileges
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" as
"[fleeble indeed."1' But not once did the dissenters mention
Nebbia.'7 6 Doctrinally, Nebbia simply was inapposite. To be sure,
the dissenters believed that the Colgate majority had erred.
Nowhere did they suggest, however, that the error lay in a failure to recognize that abandonment of the public interest limitation entailed upholding the tax in question.
Colgate was accorded a critical reception in the law reviews,177
and it was not long before another case presented the Court
with an opportunity to recant. In 1940, a Kentucky taxpayer
invoked the decision when challenging the constitutionality of a
Kentucky statute taxing deposits in in-state banks at a lower
rate than deposits in out-of-state banks.178 Kentuckian Stanley
Reed wrote the opinion rejecting the taxpayer's claims that the
statute violated the Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses, and explicitly overruling Colgate.7 ' Justice Doug-

172. See id. at 424-25.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 436-50 (Stone, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 443 (Stone, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 436-50 (Stone, J., dissenting). Stone's disagreement with Hughes and
Roberts over the scope of protection afforded by the privileges or immunities clause
continued in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See id. at 500-18 (opinion of Robeits, J.); id. at 518-32 (opinion of Stone, J.); id. at 532 (Hughes, C. J., concurring).
177. See Note, Classification in State Legislation Under the Equal Protection and
Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, 45 YALE L.J. 926,
927-30 (1936); S.J. Stern, Jr., Note, 14 N.C. L. REV. 282, 282-86 (1936); Recent Decision, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 352, 352-55 (1936); Recent Case, 11 IND. L.J. 390, 390-93
(1936); Recent Case, 1 Mo. L. REV. 187, 187-89 (1936); Recent Decision, 13 N.Y.U.
L.Q. REV. 496, 497-98 (1936); Recent Case, 3 U. CI. L. REV. 506, 506-08 (1936);
Recent Case, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 655, 655-57 (1936).
178. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940).
179. See id. at 90-93.
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las was so excited he could barely contain himself. "Three
cheers!," he wrote on the back of Reed's circulated draft, "Let's
go out and get drunk!""'o More sober were the responses of
Hughes and Roberts. Neither was prepared to repudiate Colgate.
The published report of the case states that Hughes "concurs in
the result upon the ground, as stated by the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, that the classification adopted by the legislature rested upon a reasonable basis."'a Justice Roberts, by contrast, dissented:
Four years ago in Colgate v. Harvey, this court held that the
[Eiqual [P]rotection [Cilause and the [Privileges and
[I]mmunities [C}lause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit
such a discrimination as results from the statute now under
review. I adhere to the views expressed in the opinion of the
court in that case, and I think it should be followed in this.'82
The third and final case illustrating Nebbia's limitations is
Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck.'" The Court decided Mayflower and Borden's Farm Products Co., Inc. v. Ten Eyck" the
same day, and in each case Hughes joined Roberts's opinion for
the majority.'a In Borden's Farm Products, the Court upheld
against an equal protection challenge a provision of the New
York MVilk Control Act allowing milk dealers without well-advertised trade names to sell milk at a penny less per quart than
those with well-advertised trade names."' The differential had
been incorporated into the scheme of price regulation, Roberts
explained, because:
[Tihe legislature believed that a fixed minimum price by
dealers to stores would not preserve the existing economic
method of attaining equality of opportunity. That method was
for the well-advertised dealers to rely on their advertising to
obtain a given price, and for the independents to retain their

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Box 60, Stanley Reed MSS, University of Kentucky.
Madden, 309 U.S. at 93.
Id. at 93-94 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
297 U.S. 266 (1936).
297 U.S. 251 (1936).
See id. at 251, 256; Mayflower Farms, 297 U.S. at 266-70.
See Borden's Farm Prods., 297 U.S. at 261.
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share of the market, not by counter advertising but by a
slight reduction of price."s7
To have fixed a uniform minimum price would have been to
deprive the independents of their competitive strategy while
leaving the tactics employed by the well-advertised dealers unimpaired.1 88 By establishing the price differential, the legislature
had sought to avoid having the prescription of a minimum price
disturb "the existing relationship of advantage established by
the past trade practices of the two groups."189 "There was," Roberts maintained, "a plain reason for the classification."so To
attempt to avoid disturbing the balance of advantage established
by past practice "was to strive for equality of treatment, equality
of burden, not to create inequality. To adapt the law to the existing trade practice was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary." 91 "In
the light of the facts found," wrote Roberts, "the legislature
might reasonably have thought trade conditions existed justifying the fixing of a differential. Judicial inquiry does not concern
itself with the accuracy of the legislative finding, but only with
the question whether it so lacks any reasonable basis as to be
arbitrary."l 92
The Four Horsemen filed an opinion in which they dissented
9 Their differences with
once again from the holding in Nebbia."'
Roberts, however, did not concern only the question of legislative
power to regulate milk-prices. They further maintained that the
provision in question was "grossly arbitrary and oppressive" to
the well-advertised dealers and accordingly denied them equal
protection. 9 4 Borden had acquired the public's good will by "fair

187. Id. at 261-62.
188. See id.
189. Id. at 262.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 263. For another instance in which Justices Hughes and Roberts voted
to uphold portions of the New York Milk Control statute, see Hegeman Farms Corp.
v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163, 167-72 (1934). Cf Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew,
300 U.S. 608, 609-17 (1937) (upholding portions of the Virginia Milk and Cream
Act).
193. See Borden's Farm Prods., 297 U.S. at 264 (McReynolds, J., dissenting, joined
by Van Devanter, Sutherland and Butler, J.J.).
194. Id. at 265.
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advertisement and commendable service.s 95 The statute sought
to deprive Borden "of the right to benefit by this and thereby
aid[ed] competitors to secure the business."" To sustain the
statute was to hold "that a dealer, who through merit has acquired a good reputation, can be deprived of the consequent
benefit in order that another may trade successfully." 9 ' The
statute destroyed equality of opportunity, putting Borden "at a
disadvantage because of merit."1 98 Because Borden could not
adjust its prices to compete with independent dealers, it might
"suffer utter ruin solely because of good reputation, honestly acquired."199
In Mayflower, however, the Four Horsemen joined Hughes
and Roberts in striking down a provision of the Milk Control Act
allowing the one cent differential only to those independents
who had been engaged in milk dealing continuously since April
10, 1933.2 Roberts maintained that the record disclosed no
reason for the discrimination, and that the New York authorities
did "not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the
public health or welfare generally; that the provision [would]
discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business." 20 ' As the Court had recognized in Borden's FarmProducts,
[tihe very reason for the differential was the belief that no
one could successfully market an unadvertised brand on an
even price basis with the seller of a well advertised brand.
One coming fresh into the field would not possess such a
brand and clearly could not meet the competition of those
having an established trade name and good will, unless he
were allowed the same differential as others in his class. By
denying him this advantage the law effectually barred him
from the business.2 02

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 266.
See Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 270 (1936).
Id. at 274.
Id. at 273.
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The statute effectively provided that "during the life of the law
no person or corporation might enter the business of a milk
dealer in New York City."203 It was a legislative "attempt to give
an economic advantage to those engaged in a given business at
an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry
after that date."2 0' The classification was therefore "arbitrary
and unreasonable," denying Mayflower Farms the equal protection of the laws.2 05
Taken together, Borden's Farm Products and Mayflower were
hardly a repudiation of Nebbia. They simply illustrated how
abandonment of the public interest limitation in economic regulation could co-exist with a requirement that differential treatment of similarly situated enterprises subject to such regulation
meet a reasonableness standard less relaxed than Perry Como.
Would this co-existence persist after 1937?
In United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative,Inc.,206 the Court
upheld orders of the Secretary of Agriculture that set minimum
prices for milk sales in the metropolitan areas of New York and
Boston.2 07 Justice Roberts filed a dissent, joined by Hughes "so
far as it relates to the invalidity of the order on the ground stated."2 0 s That ground was not, of course, that the federal government lacked power to prescribe minimum prices in the milk
industry.2 0 9 It was instead that, as "drawn and administered,"
one of the orders deprived small handlers of milk in the New
York marketing area of their property without due process of
law.2 10 One aim of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, on
the authority of which the order was issued, was to provide a
minimum price to be paid by milk handlers to milk producers.2 1 1
Through a device known as price "blending," the order permitted

203. Id.
204. Id. at 274.
205. Id.

206. 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
pose

See id. at 570-71.
Id. at 587 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
See id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
See id. at 543; see also id. at 584 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (specifying the purof the Act as providing a "uniform" minimum price).
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larger milk handlers selling milk both inside and outside the
marketing area to buy milk in the production area at a price
lower than the minimum prescribed for smaller handlers who
purchased milk solely for sale in the marketing area.12 This
enabled the larger handlers "to resell the milk in the marketing
area, in which no resale price is fixed, at a cut rate which is
destructive of their competitors' business." 21 3 The order therefore
"inevitably tend[ed] to destroy the business of smaller handlers
by placing them at the mercy of their larger competitors."2 14
Such a discrimination, Roberts maintained, was inconsistent
with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.215 As Borden's
Farm Products had indicated, a discrimination that allowed
dealers without a well-advertised brand name to sell at a price
just below that prescribed for those with established names had
a rational basis;216 but for Roberts, a discrimination that allowed
large handlers to undersell their smaller competitors, like a discrimination that froze out potential market entrants, was inconsistent with minimal requirements of equal treatment.
IV. THE FATE OF THE THIRD WAY

By 1939, however, Justices of the Supreme Court would express such views only in dissent.21 7 They had carried the day in

212. See id. at 584 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 586-87 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 587 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 583-87 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
216. See Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Ten Eyck, 279 U.S. 251, 261-62 (1936).
217. Lower courts continued to invalidate economic regulation on the authority of
pre-1937 interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v.
Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 534, 550-55 (N.D.N.Y. 1939) (relying on
Alton in declaring that an order of the Secretary of Agriculture issued under the
authority of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 deprived defendants
of property without due process); Noble v. Davis, 161 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Ark. 1942)
(distinguishing Nebbia and West Coast Hotel in holding statute regulating minimum
prices for barbering services violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Boothby v. City of
Westbrook, 23 A.2d 316, 319-20 (Me. 1941) (invoking Colgate in holding that ordinance prohibiting possession for sale of explosive materials within three hundred feet
of a schoolhouse but exempting existing gas stations constituted "an arbitrary discrimination between persons, firms and corporations carrying on the same business
under substantially the same conditions, and upon grounds which bear no reasonable
or real relation to the legitimate purpose of the law," thereby investing "the owners
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the mid-1930s, when Hughes's and Roberts's views had occupied
an intermediate position between the heightened scrutiny endorsed by McReynolds and the more deferential standard championed by Cardozo. Theirs was a jurisprudence that rejected the
principal categorical restraints of substantive due process while
at the same time insisting on a rationality standard with some
teeth. They were willing to embrace broader notions of public
purpose 218 and thus more relaxed standards of government neutrality 19 than were the Four Horsemen. But they were not preof existing filling stations with a monopoly in the explosive business in the designated territory" and denying equal protection); Blaustein v. Levin, 4 A.2d 861, 863-64
(Md. 1939) (relying on Colgate in holding that scheme for taxation of income from
non-resident trusts "sets up an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination between
persons of the same general class" in violation of the Equal Protection Clause); State
v. Sunset Ditch Co., 145 P.2d 219, 223 (N.M. 1944) (relying on Mayflower and
Colgate in holding that a statute authorizing dissolution of corporations for failure to
file annual reports with the State Corporation Commission, which applied only to
corporations organized under territorial law and not to corporations organized after
the date of statehood, denied equal protection); Russo v. Morgan, 21 N.Y.S.2d 637,
642 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) (relying on Mayflower in holding that rules of the Fulton
Fish Market denying use permits to tenants of upper floors constituted arbitrary and
unreasonable discrimination in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses); Commonwealth v. A. Overholt & Co., 200 A. 849, 854 (Pa. 1938) (relying
on Colgate in holding that a statute taxing liquor at two dollars per gallon regardless of its value denied equal protection); Gasque, Inc. v. Nates, 2 S.E.2d 36, 4143 (S.C. 1939) (relying on Colgate in holding that a statute imposing maximum hour
regulations on certain businesses and exempting others was "arbitrary and without
reasonable basis"); State ex rel. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. State Bd. of Health, 298
N.W. 183, 184 (Wis. 1941) (relying on Mayflower in holding that a statute applying
certain health and safety regulations only to restaurants established after the effective date of the act denied due process and equal protection).
State courts also continued to construe the due process clauses of their state
constitutions to proscribe certain forms of economic regulation. See John A.C.
Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53
NW. U. L. REV. 226, 228-51 (1958); Monrad Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive
Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91, 92-118 (1950).
218. See Nebbia v. New York 291 U.S. 502, 530 (1934); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934).
219. On the principle of neutrality, see OWEN FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE
MODERN STATE, 1888,1910, at 156, 160 (1993); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED 175-93 (1993); MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERIcAN LAW,
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 19-31 (1992); Michael Les Benedict,

Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of LaissezFaire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REv. 293, 298, 304-31 (1985); Charles W.
McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations:
Some Parameters of 'Laissez-faire' Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970,
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pared to abandon entirely the Court's traditional role of preserving state neutrality-particularly in instances that implicated
the right to pursue a lawful calling on terms of equality with all
others.22 0 Their views briefly held a dominant position in the
mid-1930s, when their votes frequently were necessary to form a
majority to uphold or invalidate regulatory legislation. But such
an intermediate posture could no longer command a majority
after Black had replaced Van Devanter and Reed had supplanted Sutherland.2 2 ' The deferential standard would tri-

973-1004 (1975); Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from
the Controversy Over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 18993 (1984); Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249,
278-79 (1987); Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 878-89
(1987).
220. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 278-80 (1932) (invalidating statute conditioning issuance of license to manufacture, sell or distribute ice
on the applicant's successful showing that existing licensed facilities in the community were inadequate to meet the public's needs; an opinion Hughes and Roberts
joined); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) (Hughes, J.) ("It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it
was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure."). For a similar view, see
CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 256-67 n.75; Friedman, supra note 140, at 1922 n.150.
For the expression of views sympathetic to such an intermediate posture, see Robert
G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34, 40-45.
221. Compare ACKERMAN, supra note 166, at 489 n.38:
. See [Mayflower Farms Inc. v. Ten Eyck], 297 U.S. 266 (1936), in
which Roberts wrote an opinion of the Court that is transparently inconsistent with the principles proclaimed two years later in Carolene Products..
.. In joining the Mayflower majority, Roberts and Hughes made it
abundantly clear that they continued to endorse the Court's historic mission of aggressively protecting free market liberties under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I do not suggest that Mayflower was flatly inconsistent with Nebbia.
The later case protected the right to enter a business, while Nebbia's
retreat concerned price regulation. As a consequence, it remained open
for the Court to rationalize both cases or use one as a lever for the
subsequent reconsideration of the other. Only after the switch of 1937 did
it become clear that Nebbia, rather than Mayflower, would prosper in the
years ahead.
This means that legalist scholars are begging a big question when
they use Nebbia to disparage the importance of 1937. On their view,
Nebbia had already undercut substantive due process in 1934, and so it
is melodramatic to focus on 1937 as a crucial moment in the demise of
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umph,2 22 and the jurisprudence of Hughes and Roberts would
suffer the fate of a project that was never fully developed and
never well-understood: it would be seen as inconsistent, incoherent, inscrutable. It would become conventional wisdom2 that
they had waffled unpredictably back and forth between the only
two possible positions: "aggressive" review and "deferential"
review. Roberts had conducted "an ultimately unsuccessful
search for a coherent judicial philosophy."22 Hughes was "the
man on the flying trapeze," 225 swinging to and fro betwixt the
two poles. Jurisprudentially, they were moody guys.
Black's and Douglas's refusal to assent to the contested tribute in Stone's letter to Roberts suggests that for some this interpretation had already become unshakable. Stone and Frankfurter certainly had subscribed to that position in 1937. They
couldn't see how Roberts had demonstrated fidelity to principle,
because they didn't understand the principle. But judgments
reached in the midst of a crisis and with limited information are
not always the most durable. By 1945, having witnessed
Roberts's post-1937 performance, Stone and Frankfurter had
begun to understand, even if they did not approve.
It is often pointed out that, after 1936, the Court never struck
down a piece of economic regulation on the ground that it denied
economic substantive due process. 22 6 This is a significant obserlaissez-faire constitutionalism. But this interpretation of Nebbia presupposes the importance of 1937. Without the switch in time, Nebbia, and
not Mayflower, might have been the case with the brief half-life!
Id. (citations omitted).
222. A standard far more deferential than that advocated by Holmes and Brandeis.
See Phillips, supra note 22, at 1083-87; G. Edward White, The Canonization of
Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
576, 578 (1995).

223. For a fascinating recounting of the manner in which the conventional view of
this period was constructed and perpetuated, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL: A REASSESSMENT (forthcoming 2000); see also his exceptionally perceptive Cabining the Constitutional History of the New Deal in Time, 94
MICH. L. REv. 1392 (1996).
224. UROFSKY, supra note 19, at 15. Laura Kalman puts the point more strongly:
"In my heart, I still believe the Roberts of 1937 had undergone a jurisprudential
lobotomy. . . ." Kalman, supra note 150, at 2188.
225. DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 74, 94-97 (1936)

(describing Hughes as a "weak-kneed oscillator").
226. See, e.g., TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND HIS CRITICS 53
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vation about the course of American constitutional history; but
insofar as it purports to inform us about what happened in 1937,
it focuses on the wrong unit of analysis. The Court afforded
subsequent legislation deferential review not because Hughes
and Roberts changed in 1937, but because President Roosevelt
was able to change the Court around them. Even a casual examination of the U.S. Reports reveals the tenacity with which they
continued to cling to established views.2 27 Within those pages
there are lost fidelities, waiting to be found.

(1988).
227. For additional examples, see CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 31; Friedman, supra
note 140, at 1967-74.

